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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
1750 ~-........ ~-----"--------and 
vs. 
Appealed from the District Court of the~---'---~~ ---
Judicial District for the State of Idaho , in and 
for ----~-~---- County 
Hon. --'-'---~-~ ...... ~"-'---"----'--~-~ District Judge 
Attorney_ for Appellant_ 
'· 
Attor,n~y-· for R espondent_·_ 
Filed this ----,,,- day of ----'------- 20 __ 
~ A/rdtJ~/ 
_________ Clerk 
Deputy 
., 
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HDAYO COUl'ITY DISTRICT COURT 
Michael McNichols < ,...,,_ 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. ("-'h, 
. FILED 1-:J 
AT 5: OD O'CLOCK 1 .M. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewistown, ID 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 746-9295 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
WILLIAM WOLFE, ) 
) ., CASE NO. CR 18290 ,, .. f~, 
Petitioner, ) MOTION TO SUBMIT 
) BRIEF OF NORTH CENTRAL 
VS. ) IDAHO JURISDICTIONAL 
) ALLIANCE, AMICUS CURIAE, 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) LIMITED IN SCOPE, IN SUPPORT 
) OF THE IDAHO COUNTY 
Respondent. ) PROSECUTOR 
A. 
The North Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance (Alliance), a group of 
governmental entities interested in jurisdictional issues within the 1863 reservation 
, , 
boundary, hereby moves to submit a brief, amicus curiae, limited in scope, to address the 
reservation disestablishment issue in support of the position of the Idaho County Special 
Prosecutor. 
MOTION TO SUBMIT BRIEF 
BY NORTH CENTRAL IDAHO 
JURISDICTIONAL ALLIANCE 
- 1 -
UU0282 
This brief is submitted in the event the court should address the diminishment or 
disestablishment of the Nez Perce Reservation. 
The Alliance is an unincorporated association; its members include 2 counties, 9 
cities, 3 school districts and 7 highway districts in north central Idaho, whose 
geographical boundaries include land which was within the Nez Perce Indian reservation 
as it existed prior to 1894. This area is now ninety percent (90%) owned and populated 
by non-members of the Nez Perce Tribe. 
The purpose of the Alliance is to provide an organization to foster cooperation 
between its members and to focus their efforts toward obtaining a resolution of their 
jurisdictional authority in relationship to the jurisdictional authority of the United States 
and the Nez Perce Tribe. 
B. 
The amicus curiae submits that the arguments of the Special Prosecutor in 
opposition to the petition for post conviction relief are compelling. In the event this court 
disagrees with that position, this amicus curiae brief concludes that the original 
reservation has been diminished. That diminishment also supports the position of the 
Idaho County Special Prosecutor. The jurisdiction of the State of Idaho in this case is 
clear. 
This amicus curiae brief supports the decision of Judge Barry Wood in the Snake 
River Basin Adjudication. Judge Wood held that the 1863 Nez Perce Reservation was 
disestablished by an act of Congress. 
MOTION TO SUBMIT BRIEF 
BY NORTH CENTRAL IDAHO 
JURISDICTIONAL ALLIANCE 
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Respectfully submitted this 31st day of August 2006. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
By: 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Motion to 
Submit Brief of North Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance, Amicus Curiae, Limited in 
Scope, in Support of the Idaho County Prosecutor was served on August 31, 2006, by 
United States first class mail, postage prepaid, on the following named persons at their 
respective post office addresses as follows: 
William Wolfe 
Inmate #18593 
ICCHCllB 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
Brit Groom 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 227 
Cottonwood, ID 83522 
MOTION TO SUBMIT BRIEF 
BY NORTH CENTRAL IDAHO 
JURISDICTIONAL ALLIANCE 
Jeff P. Payne 
Idaho County Prosecutor 
114 South Idaho 
Grangeville, ID 83530 
Michael E. McNichols 
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Jeff P. Payne 
Attorney at Law 
114 S. Idaho Avenue 
Grangeville, ID 83530 
Phone: (208) 983-0760 
!SB# 3966 
Attorney for: Plaintiff 
,,._,.. .... , 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR 18290 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
VS. ) MOTION FOR CHANGE OF 
) SPECIAL PROSECUTOR 
) 
WILLIAM WOLFE, ) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW, Jeff P. Payne, Special Prosecuting Attorney for Idaho County in the above 
entitled matter, and moves the Court to order that Jeff P. Payne be relieved of the duties of special 
prosecutor in this matter and that another special prosecutor be appointed, if necessary, to prosecute 
any further matters that may arise in this matter. 
The defendant in this matter is currently in the custody of the Idaho Department of 
Corrections. There are no prosecutorial matters currently pending, however, as the defendant is 
currently in the custody of the Idaho Department of Corrections on this matter, there is the potential 
that matters requiring prosecution or prosecutorial decisions could occur in the future. 
I will be unable to continue to serve as a special prosecutor in this matter after August 31, 
2007. 
DATED this / C,,ti)day of August, 2007. 
MOTION FOR CHANGE 
28 OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR OU0285 
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JefffP./Playne / . 
;! !} 
Specia1 Prosecutor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document 
was served upon the following person( s) in the 
manner indicated below on the-'-"-'--'--'- day 
of August, 2007: 
Jonathon D. Hallin 
Wilcox & Hallin, PLLC 
200 Part Street 
P.O. Box 947 
McCall, ID 83638 
MOTION FOR CHANGE 
U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered )< Courthouse Tray 
Via Facsimile 
28 OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR Page 2 of 2 
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Jeff P. Payne 
Attorney at Law 
114 S. Idaho Avenue 
Grangeville, ID 83530 
Phone: (208) 983-0760 
ISB # 3966 
Attorney for: Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
8 STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
9 Plaintiff, 
10 VS. 
11 
12 WILLIAM WOLFE, 
13 Defendant. 
) Case No. CR 18290 
) 
) 
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
) FOR CHANGE OF SPECIAL 
) PROSECUTOR 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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Having considered Jeff P. Payne's motion for change of special prosecutor in the above-
entitled and numbered mater, and good cause appearing therefore; 
23 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Jeff P. Payne's motion for change of special prosecutor be 
granted, and Jeff P. Payne is relieved of the duties of special prosecutor in the above-entitled and 
numbered matter. 
Dfatrict Judge U 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
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1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2 The undersigned hereby certifies that a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document 
3 was served upon the following person(s) in the 
")~ I 
manner indicated below on the ex, .,,:)0 day 
4 of August, 2007: 
5 Jonathon D. Hallin 
Wilcox & Hallin, PLLC 
6 200 Part Street 
P.O. Box 947 
7 McCall, ID 83638 
8 Jeff P. Payne 
Attorney at Law 
9 114 South Idaho 
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Grangeville, ID 83430 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered c/ Courthouse Tray 
Via Facsimile 
__ U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered / Courthouse Tray 
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William Wolfe 
I .D.O.C. #18593 
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A 
P .0. BOX 14 
~-- .. ··~ -,,- - ., __ 
DOCKETED APR 2 5 2011 Boise, ID. 83707 
In Pro-se ii Kf-lHY ~CKERMAN 
.rc_Li. icE:~~,eu~.ITll~irRJ'f\. ~T ' '\1 •1 ti !J-t ,, \ ' . ' , , ' v L r "" . UTY \., f\ ..... 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT-~ 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO. 
William Wolfe 
Petitioner 
vs 
People State of Idaho 
Respondent 
Case No. CR-1982-18290 
Motion to Notice Hearing 
Request for Judicial Notice 
Comes now the petitioner, William Wolfe Pro-se, respectfully moves this court, 
court ~lerk to Notice this action for hearing in the above captioned criminal 
action Rule 35 Motion to Reconsider. 
( 1) Rule 35 reconsider petition has been ripe before this court for ruling 
since 2004-2005. 
( 2) Petitioner requests this Court to take Judicial Notice of the files and 
records contained in the records of both t.he criminal action and the Post 
Conviction action, Case No. CV-2005-36455. 
( 3) Request for Judicial Notice is made pursuant to provisions of rules of 
evidence, rule 201. 
(4) Petitioner request hearing date in this action/or ruling at the Courts 
earliest convenience. 
Where for the Petitioner prays this Court Grant this motion and any other 
relief it deems appropriate. 
Date: 4-21-2011 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I William Wolfe do swear by my affixed signature that I sent a true and 
correct copies of the Motion of Notice Hearing to the Prosecuter at the 
address below and the Original to the Court clerk. 
Clerk of the Court 
Idaho County Courthouse 
320 West Main 
Grangeville ID. 93530 
Sent via U.S.P.S~ on 
So Sworn 
Motion to Notice Hearing pg-1 
Idaho County Prosecutor 
Idaho County Courthouse 
320 West Main 
Grangeville ID. 93530 
the 21 day of April 2011 .• 
, ~ ~ ?G/4~~~ 
William Wolfe 
William Wolfe 
I.D.O.C. #18593 
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
In Pro-se 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT_,bF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO. 
William Wolfe 
Petitioner 
V. 
People State of Idaho 
Respondent 
Case No. CR-1982-18290 
Motion for Judicial Notice of New 
Idaho State Supreme Court Opinion 
In Support of Motion to Reconsider 
I.C.R. 35 Motion 
I William Wolfe hereby plead with this Court to take Judicial Notice of a 
new Idaho State Supreme Court Opinion in support of my Motion to Reconsider 
I.C.R. 35 motion. 
I have just received a copy of a new opinion from the Idaho State Supreme 
Court, State of Idaho V. Daniel Francis Lute, Docket No. 37394, 2011 opinion 
No. 50, Field: April 20, 2011. ( I have attached a copy of this ruling for 
your convenince.) 
My case and the Lute case are very much the same, in that both cases 
where brought up in a I.C.R. 35 Motion and the crux of both cases is 
Jurisdiction. We must determine whether the District Court had Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction to consider the charges filed against Wolfe when the Grand Jury 
that indicted him was acting without legal authority. 
My case and State V. Lute are also aJ.ike in that the state argued that 
Lute's case was moot because Lute brought his I.C.R. 35 motion over fourteen 
years after his five year sentence was intered. In my case the State is also 
contending that I am time barred, when in fact Idaho Rule 35 Allow's a trial 
court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. As it did in State V. Lute. 
Id. As a general matter, it is a question of Law as to whether a sentence is 
illegal or was imposed in an illegal fashion, and the Court exercises free 
review over question of law. Id. Jurisdiction is like wise a question of law 
and is reviewed de novo. State V. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 
1097 (1998). Which pertains to the Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a 
general type of class of dispute. " Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158, 
P.3d 305, 308 (2007). The source of this power comes from Article V, Section 
20, of the Idhao Constitution, which provides that district courts "shall have 
original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such 
appellate jurisdiction as my be conferred by law." This issue is so 
fundamental to the propriety of a court's actions, that subject matter 
jurisdiction can never be waived or consented to, and a court has a sua sponte 
duty to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case. 
Motion for Judicial Notice. P-1. 
Uuu' ,,_.-).., 
. ,G ':Ju 
See Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(g)(4). Furthermore, judgments and orders made without 
subject matter jurisdiction are void and "are subject to collateral attack, 
and are not entitled to recognition in other states under the full faith and 
credit clause of the United States Constitution." Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. 
Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626-27 1 586 P.2d 1068, 1070-1071 (1978). This Court 
exercises free review over questions of jurisdiction. 
Petitioner Also request's this Court to take Judicial Notice of the files 
and records contained in the records of both the criminal action and the Post 
Conviction action1 Case No. CV-2005-36455. 
I would like to plead with the Court to apply the State v. Lute opinion 
as it apply's to my case. 
Dated this \ day of May, 2011. 
William Wolfe 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \ day of May, 2011. I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the attached Motion 'for Judicial Notice of New Idaho State 
Supreme Court Opinion In Sipport of Motion to Reconsider I.C.R. 35 Motion, via 
prison mail system for processing to the United States mail system, postage 
prepaid, addressed to: 
Clerk of the Court 
Idaho County Courthouse 
320 West Main 
Grangeville ID. 93530 
Motion for Judicial Notice. P-2. 
William Wolfe 
Idaho County Prosecutor 
Idaho County Courthouse 
320 West Main 
Grangeville ID. 93530 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
DANIEL FRANCIS LUTE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Docket no. 37394 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Boise, April ion Term 
2011 Opinion No. 50 
Filed: April 20, 2011 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
________________ ,) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State ofidaho, Ada 
County. Hon. Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge. 
District court denial of ICR 35 motion to correct illegal sentence, reversed. 
Daniel Francis Lute, Boise, pro se appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
BURDICK, Justice 
This case arises on appeal from the district court's denial of Daniel Lute's Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence. Lute argues that the grand jury that indicted 
him was acting without authority as its commission had expired and, therefore, the district court 
had no subject matter jurisdiction over his case and could not properly enter a Judgment of 
conviction. Lute further argues that the conviction underlying his sentence is for something that 
is not a crime in Idaho and, as such, any sentence given for such conduct is necessarily illegal. 
We reverse the district court's denial of Lute's I.C.R. 35 motion and remand with instructions to 
grant the motion and vacate Lute's conviction, consistent with this opinion. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On May 6, 1993, a grand jury indicted Lute for the offense of "Battery with the Intent to 
Commit a Serious Felony", specifically "rape and/or kidnapping." Following his arraignment, 
Lute entered into a plea agreement with the State, under which Lute agreed to plead guilty and 
1 
the State agreed to amend the indictment to eliminate reference to "rape", with the resulting 
charge reading "Battery with the Intent to Commit a Serious Felony, [to wit], Kidnapping, I.C. § 
18-911." The judge used handwritten strike throughs to amend the indictment, eliminating any 
reference to rape. A judgment of conviction was entered on August 17, 1993, sentencing Lute to 
five years fixed, to run concurrently with a sentence that Lute was already serving. The 
judgment did not specify which serious felony Lute intended to commit when he committed 
battery. 
On August 30, 2007, approximately nine years after the expiration of Lute's sentence, 
Lute filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for correction or reduction of sentence. Lute complained that the 
records of the Idaho Department of Corrections showed that he had been convicted of a sex 
crime, and requested that the judgment be amended to eliminate this confusion. The district 
court granted Lute's request, 1 amending the judgment to read that Lute had been convicted for 
"Battery with Intent to Commit a Serious Felony, to wit, Kidnapping, I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-91 I." 
On January 29, 2008, Lute filed a second !.C.R. 35 motion, arguing that his sentence was 
invalid because the crime he pled guilty to was not proscribed in the Idaho Code. Lute also 
argued that the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction 
when it entered the judgment, because the term of the grand jury had already expired at the time 
he was indicted. The State acknowledged that the grand jury's term had expired at the time of 
Lute's indictment, but argued that the defect was not jurisdictional and was waived by Lute when 
he entered into a Rule 11 plea agreement and pled guilty to the amended indictment. 
The district court denied Lute's January 29, 2008, motion, finding that a validly entered 
guilty plea rendered the procedural defects in the grand jury indictment harmless, and no 
jurisdictional defect existed. Lute appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Lute filed a 
petition for review, which this Court granted. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a case on petition for review from the Court of Appeals this Court gives 
due consideration to the decision reached by the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the 
decision of the trial court. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009). 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 allows a trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. Id. As a 
general matter, it is a question of law as to whether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an 
1 It is unclear whether the district court amended the judgment on the basis ofI.C.R. 35 or I.C.R. 36. 
2 
illegal fashion, and this Court exercises free review over questions of law. Id. Jurisdiction is 
likewise a question of law and is reviewed de nova. State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379,381, 957 
P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998). 
III. ANALYSIS 
The crux of this appeal is jurisdiction. We must determine whether the district court had 
subject matter jurisdiction to consider the charges filed against Lute when the grand jury that 
indicted him was acting without legal authority. If we find that the district court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over the case initially, then this Court must determine whether the district 
court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by Lute under his I.C.R. 35 
motion where Lute attacked the conviction itself, not merely the sentence. 
A. Lute's appeal is not moot. 
The State argues that Lute's appeal is moot because Lute brought his I.C.R. 35 motion 
over fourteen years after his five year sentence was entered, and that sentence was fully 
completed prior to his filing of the I.C.R. 35 motion. The State contends that I.C.R. 35 does not 
grant the district court authority to grant relief for a sentence that has been served in its entirety. 
Lute responds that it is well established under Idaho law that the completion of a sentence does 
not make a felony conviction moot. 
"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is 
capable of being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief." Koch v. Canyon Cnty., 
145 Idaho 158, 163, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008) (quotation omitted). In Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 
899, 901, 935 P .2d 162, 164 (1997), this Court held that "a felony conviction has collateral 
consequences and the fact that [an appellant] has fully served his sentence does not moot [that 
appellant's] appeal." Abrogated on other grounds by Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, _, 233 
P.3d 61, 68 (2010). This is in line with the United States Supreme Court's statement that "a 
criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal 
consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction." Sibron v. New York, 
392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). The State has offered no such showing here. 
The State contends that I.C.R. 35 grants courts the limited jurisdictional power to 
consider whether a sentence is illegal, and where the sentence itself has been completed a court 
is powerless to take any meaningful corrective action under I.C.R. 35-as the appellant will not 
have his grievance addressed by any modification of that sentence. However, where there is a 
3 
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jurisdictional defect, this court has authority to address that issue, even if it is not raised by the 
parties themselves. State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003). 
Furthem1ore, "[ w ]here it is apparent from the record that the act the defendant was criminally 
convicted for is not a crime according to the laws of the state, this Court has the authority to 
vacate the convictions sua sponte . ... " Id. at 484, 80 P.3d at 1085. 
"Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to amend 
or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time 
for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 
P.3d 711, 714 (2003). However, where a court properly has jurisdiction to consider a case-as it 
does here to consider Lute's !.C.R. 35 motion-and it is apparent that there is an issue 
concerning subject matter jurisdiction or that a defendant was convicted for something that is not 
a crime, this Court must correct that error. See Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483-84, 80 P.3d at 1084--
85. 
B. The district court did not have jurisdiction to convict Lute when the grand jury that 
indicted him was acting without authority. 
Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution states, inter alia, "[n]o person shall be held 
to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment or indictment of 
a grand jury or on information of the public'prosecutor .... " Under what was previously !.C.R. 
6(j), and is now !.C.R. 6.8, "no grand jury shall serve more than six (6) months unless 
specifically ordered by the court which summoned the grand jury." "An indictment issued by a 
grand jury whose term is up and has not been validly extended is void .... " United States v. 
Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238, 1240 (7th Cir. 1990). As this Court stated in State v. Urrabazo: 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general 
type or class of dispute." Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 
(2007). The source of this power comes from Article V, Section 20, of the Idaho 
Constitution, which provides that district courts "shall have original jurisdiction in 
all cases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be 
conferred by law." This issue is so fundamental to the propriety of a court's 
actions, that subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived or consented to, and a 
court has a sua sponte duty to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a 
case. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(g)(4). Furthermore, judgments and orders made 
without subject matter jurisdiction are void and "are subject to collateral attack, 
and are not entitled to recognition in other states under the full faith and credit 
clause of the United States Constitution." Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 
Idaho 624, 626-27, 586 P.2d 1068, 1070-71 (1978). This Court exercises free 
review over questions of jurisdiction. 
4 
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150 Idaho 158, _, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248-49 (2010) (internal citations omitted). "The 
information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the State of 
Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court." State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 
91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004). 
In State v. Dalling, a grand jury was convened on October 13, 1992, and that grand jury 
lost its legal status as a body empowered to act as a grand jury six months later, on April 13, 
1993, in accordance with I.C.R. 6.8. 128 Idaho 203, 204-05, 911 P.2d 1115, 1116-17 (1996). 
Nevertheless, the grand jury continued to meet after April 13, and was not officially discharged 
until May 7, 1993. Id. at 204, 911 P.2d at 1116. On May 6, 1993-approximately three weeks 
after its lawful term had expired-the grand jury met and returned an indictment against Dalling. 
Id. Dalling moved for the indictment to be dismissed on the basis that the grand jury had no 
authority to act and, accordingly, the district court never properly had the case before it. Id. The 
district court granted Dalling's motion to dismiss, and on appeal this Court affirmed, finding that 
where the grand jury returned an indictment after its term had expired, that indictment was 
invalid. Id. at 205, 911 P.2d at 1117 ("Upon the expiration of its term under I.C.R. 6(j), the 
grand jury no longer had the authority to meet and return indictments."). Thus in Dafling, this 
Court recognized that wher.e a grand jury does not have a legally recognized existence, any 
indictments that a grand jury returns are invalid. 
The expired grand jury that entered an invalid indictment against Dalling was the same 
expired grand jury that entered an invalid indictment against Lute. In fact, the indictments 
against Dalling and Lute were entered on the same day. The State conceded below that the grand 
jury in this case did not have authority to indict Lute. On appeal, the State devotes much of its 
argument to the issue of a "defective indictment" and the effect of a guilty plea on "defects" in 
grand jury proceedings. However, there was no "defective" indictment i:ri this case; rather there 
was no indictment under the law. Likewise, the group of citizens that issued the purported 
indictment was not a grand jury. As such, there was no defect in the grand jury process; rather 
there was no grand jury process at all. 
As a valid indictment was never entered against Lute, the district court never had subject 
matter jurisdiction over Lute's case under Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. See 
Rogers, 140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at 1132. Therefore, we reverse the district court's denial of 
Lute's I.C.R. 35 motion and remand with instructions to grant Lute's motion and vacate Lute's 
5 
conviction on the basis that the district court never properly had jurisdiction over the case. 
Having reversed on this issue, we decline to consider any other arguments raised by Lute. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We reverse the district court's denial of Lute's !.C.R. 35 motion, and remand with 
instructions to vacate Lute's conviction on the basis that no valid indictment or information was 
returned in the case and, as such, the district court never properly had jurisdiction to hear it. 
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF IDAHO 
) 
WILLIAM WOLF, ) 
) 
Petitioner/Defendant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent/Plaintiff. ) 
) 
CASE NO. CV2005-36455, 
and CR 1982-1-8-9-2--9- t '3J.Qo 
ORDER DISMISSING MOTION 
Mr. Wolf was convicted of murder. In addition to appealing his 
conviction he also filed a Motion for relief from an illegal sentence pursuant 
to ICR 35 in his criminal case # CR 1982-18920, and a Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief in case # CV 2005-36455. Both the Motion pursuant to 
ICR 35 and the Petition for Post-Conviction relief alleged, among other 
grounds, that the victim of the crime was an enrolled member of a native 
American tribe and that the crime took place within the boundaries of the 
Nez Perce Reservation. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR HEARING 
UU0298 
1 
Mr. Wolf argues that the State of Idaho lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to try him for this crime and his conviction and sentence were 
therefore illegal. 
The Court, in an order filed May 31, 2005 directed that the issues be 
decided in one case, Case #CV 2005-36455. The Court fully addressed all 
issues raised by Mr. Wolf in both his Motion for relief pursuant to ICR 35 and 
his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in its Memorandum Opinion of October 
26, 2006. All of Mr. Wolf's claims for relief were dismissed by the Court's 
Order of December 21, 2006, including his claim that the State of Idaho 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
Mr. Wolf's request for a hearing on his Motion for relief pursuant to ICR 
35 that he filed in December 2004 is DENIED on the grounds and for the 
reasons that he has already had a hearing on that Motion and it was Denied. 
Dated this 29th day of April, 2011. 
Michael J. Griffi 
District Court Judge 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR HEARING 
OUU29~ 
2 
William Wolfe 
I.D.O.C. #18593 
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A 
P.O. BOX 14 
1 Idaho 82707 
Appellant 
IDAHO COUNTY OISTRICY -
AT IO~ jQ f.½-.Ep COURT 
------;.. V 1-LVCK-.B.. .M. 
JUN - 9 2011 
L KA.THY M. ~Kf=RMAN 
F /:::, I R!CT COURT 
' DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAH0 1 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO. 
William Wolfe 
Appellant 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Respondent 
Case No. CR-1982-18290 
S.C. Docket No. 
NaI'ICE OF APPEAL 
(I.C.R. 35 ILLEGAL SENTENCE) 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT I STATE OF IDAHO, JI.ND THE PARTY 1 S ATTORNEYS 
IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant appeals aginst the above-named respondent to the 
Idaho Supreme Court from the Second Judicial District Court in the County of 
Idaho in the above-entitled action. The Honorable Michael J. Griffin 
presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court I and the 
Judgment or order described in paragraph l above are appealable orders under 
and pursuant to Rule l](c)(l-l0)1I.A.R. 
3. a preliminary statement of the issues on appeal I which . the appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal1 provided any such issues on appeal shall not 
prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal1 are: 
ISSUES 
On February 221 19821 William Wolfe was charged with first degree murder 
in the District Court of Idaho County for Killing Scott Gold outside the 
Silver Dollar Bar in Stites Idaho. 
Mr. Wolfe contends that Mr. Gold was a Native American and that the 
Silver Dollar bar in Stites Idaho is located on the Nez Perce Reservation. 
Thus the State Of Idaho did NOT have Subject Matter Jurisdiction and deprived 
him of his right to liberty without due process of law. 
Dated this S- day of June1 2011. 
U. uo·---· ~ 
~JO u 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the :£ day of June, 2011. I mailed a true and 
correct copy of this NOTICE OF APPEAL for the purpose of filing with the court 
and of mailing a true and correct copy via prison mail system for processing 
to the U.S. mail system to: 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal 0ivision 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID. 83720-0010 
Idaho County Prosecutor 
Idaho County Courthouse 
320 West MainAve. 
Grangeville, ID. 83530 
000301. 
William Wolfe 
I.D.O.C. #18593 
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A 
P.O. BOX 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
1-\ppellant 
DOCKETfD 
, IDAHO COUNT( DISTRICT COURT 
: lD ' )2. FILED A 
; AT 1 '-O'CLOCK ; ,, 
_____ ,ll'I. 
JUN q 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO. 
William Wolfe 
Appellant 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Respondent 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
Case No. CR-1982-18290 
S.C. Docket No. 
------------
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR 
FEE WAIVER (PRISONER) 
Appellant asks to start or defend this case without fees, and swears under 
oath: 
l. This is an action for I.C.R. 35 Motion. 
2. I am unable to pay court costs. I verify that the statements made in this 
affidavit are true and correct. I understand that a false statement in this 
affidavit is perjury and I can be sent to prison for (1) one to (14) fourteen 
years. 
3. I have attached to this affidavit a current statement of my inmate account, 
certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the activity of the 
account over a period of the last 6 months. I understand that I am not an 
indigent prisoner, but I am a needy prisoner and am unable to pay fee 1 s or to 
hire counsel to represent me. 
INDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE 
Name William Wolfe, I.D.O.C. #18593 
Address: I.S.C.I. Unit l3C-68A P.O. Box 14, Boise ID. 83707. 
Date of Birth:  
ASSETS 
I am without bank accounts, stocks, bonds, or any real or any other form of 
property. I am unable to offer any other form of security. 
MOTION Al.\JD AFFIDAVIT FOR FEE WAIVER (PRISONER) pg-1 
UUOJO~~ 
Dated this Y day of June, 2011. 
William Wolfe 1 
Witnessed By, G11.g :,{ /1J :J WV\ Dated /2- 5 -/ / 
Witnessed By,/«~'@~ Dated &- :z:-c/ 
Witnessed By:<:;:--~ Dated j,-S-- Ir 
---- ( 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR FEE WAIVER (PRISONER) pg-2 
U'IU ),l U JU-:; 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6 day of June, 2011. I mailed a true and 
correct copy of this MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR FEE WAIVER (PRISONER) for the 
purpose of filing with the court and of mailing a true and correct copy via 
prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to: 
~/~//4/~ 
William Wolfe 7 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID. 83720-0010 
Idaho County Prosecutor 
Idaho County Courthouse 
320 West MainAve. 
Grangeville, ID. 83530 
UUOJQ.: 
~-
= IDOC TRUST-==-======= OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 05/18/2011 = 
Doc No: 18593 Name: WOLFE, WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL 
TIER-C CELL-68 
Transaction Dates: 04/0l/2010-05/18/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
87.04 4424.41 4340.38 3.01 
-------------------------------=TRANSACTIONS--------------------------------
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
04/07/2010 HQ0495144-161 
04/12/2010 II0495599-046 
04/13/2010 II0495824-0ll 
04/19/2010 II0496440-040 
04/20/2010 II0496550-005 
04/26/2010 II0497069-040 
04/30/2010 HQ0497551-050 
04/30/2010 HQ0497552-050 
05/04/2010 HQ0498053 009 
05/10/2010 II0499330 063 
05/10/2010 II0499330-064 
05/19/2010 HQ0500351-004 
05/20/2010 HQ0500585-001 
05/24/2010 HQ0500719-009 
05/24/2010 II0500720-009 
05 24/2010 II0500738-037 
05 24/2010 II0500738-038 
06 01/2010 II0501493-003 
06/01/2010 II0501521-046 
06/02/2010 HQ0501665-003 
06/02 2010 II0501666-003 
06/02 2010 HQ0501818-009 
06/07 2010 II0502279-048 
06/07/2010 II0502279-049 
06/15/2010 II0503495-009 
06/21/2010 HQ0504083-008 
06/21/2010 II0504084-008 
16/28/2010 II0504837-031 
J7/02/2010 HQ0505501-009 
07/06/2010 II0505667-039 
07/12/2010 II0506561-045 
07/19/2010 II0507542-041 
07/26/2010 II0508248-042 
08/02/2010 II0508954-029 
08/04/2010 HQ0509398-010 
08/16/2010 HQ0511006-002 
J8/16/2010 HQ0511007-008 
68/16/2010 II0511008-008 
68/23/2010 II0511745-041 
030- 4/2010 CI INC CI INCOME 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
335- 3/2010 INTERE 
935- 3/2010 INTERE 
030- 5/2010 CI INC 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
039-CR CHK<SP.V 
066-CK HOBBY 
067-CK TX HQ500719 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
072-METER MAIL 
099-COMM SPL 
066-CK HOBBY 
067-CK TX HQ501665 
030- 6/2010 CI INC 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
INTEREST 
INTEREST 
CI INCOME 
RCPT MO 
SA"-l TRANS 
111217 
111217 
160462 
163945 
163945 
CI INCOME 
066-CK HOBBY 171561 
067-CK TX HQ504083 171561 
099-COMM SPL 
030- 7/2010 CI INC CI INCOME 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
030- 8/2010 CI INC 
061-CK I;NMATE 
066-CK HOBBY 
067-CK TX HQ511007 
099-COMM SPL 
UUUJU: 
CI INCOME 
176939 
136969 
136969 
253.61 
75. 36DB 
73.32DB 
78.07DB 
58.30DB 
34.llDB 
0.07 
0.07DB 
256.03 
74.40DB 
35.00DB 
20.00 
621.59 
105.91DB 
5.30DB 
79.24DB 
332.35DB 
5.70DB 
59.16DB 
51.96DB 
2.60DB 
234.27 
57.82DB 
84.lODB 
46.12DB 
106.96DB 
5.35DB 
28'.73DB 
255.03 
75.05DB 
66.37DB 
14.58DB 
59.78DB 
33.55DB 
272.35 
50.00DB 
22.07DB 
l.lODB 
76.39DB 
340.65 
265.29 
191.97 
113.90 
55.60 
21.49 
21.56 
21.49 
277.52 
203.12 
168.12 
188.12 
809.71 
703.80 
698.50 
619.26 
286.91 
281.21 
222.05 
170.09 
167.49 
401.76 
343.94 
259.84 
213.72 
106.76 
101. 41 
72.68 
327.71 
252.66 
186.29 
171.71 
111.93 
78.38 
350.73 
300.73 
278.66 
277.56 
201.17 
= IDOC TRUST--========= OFFENDER BANK BALANCES 
-===-==-== 05/18/2011 = 
Doc No. 18593 Name: WOLFE, WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL 
TIER-C CELL-68 
Transaction Dates: 04/0l/2010-05/18/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
87.04 4424.41 4340.38 3.01 
--------------------------------TRANSACTIONS----------------------=--=-=-=== 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
~8/23/2010 HQ05ll839-016 
08/30/2010 II0512627-025 
09/07/2010 II0513484-036 
09/07/2010 HQ0513532-010 
09/13/2010 II05l4499-046 
09/13/2010 II0514499-047 
09/20/2010 II05l5259-036 
09/27/2010 II0516010-022 
09/27/2010 II0516010-023 
10/04/2010 II0516803-027 
lO 07/2010 HQ0517618-008 
10 11/2010 II0517905-051 
~O 18/2010 II05l877l-037 
10/18/2010 II05l877l-038 
10/25/2010 II0519483-029 
11/01/2010 II0520262-020 
11/04/2010 HQ0520778~009 
11 08/2010 II0521235-035 
'11 15/2010 II0522080-032 
11 17/2010 II0522469-007 
11 21/2010 II0522883-026 
·11 26/2010 II0523384-007 
~1/26/2010 II0523384-008 
~1/26/2010 II0523384-009 
ll/29/2010 II052346l-02l 
ll/29/2010 HQ0523483-005 
12/06/2010 II0524354-036 
12/06/2010 HQ0524371-009 
12 13/2010 II0525676-042 
12 13/2010 II0525676-043 
12 16/2010 HQ0526262-005 
12 19/2010 II0526605-042 
12 20/2010 II0526794-013 
12/20/2010 II0526794-015 
12/20/2010 II0526795-013 
12/22/2010 II0527197-001 
12/22/2010 II0527197-006 
12/22/2010 II0527208-004 
12/27/2010 II0527533-013 
061-CK INMATE 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
030- 9/2010 CI 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
030-10/2010 CI 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
030-11/2010 CI 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
072-METER MAIL 
099-COMM SPL 
072-METER MAIL 
072-METER MAIL 
072-METER MAIL 
099-COMM SPL 
061-CK INMATE 
099-COMM SPL 
030-12/2010 CI 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
072-METER MAIL 
072-METER MAIL 
072-METER MAIL 
072-METER MAIL 
072-METER MAIL 
072-METER MAIL 
071-MED CO-PAY 
176940 
INC CI INCOME 
INC CI INCOME 
INC CI INCOME 
164516 
169001 
169000 
164515 
163861 
INC CI INCOME 
RTCP MO 
169002 
179154 
181803 
181818 
181804 
181826 
407427 
Uuu ·,,) JUc. 
50.00DB 
65.99DB 
65.72DB 
280.96 
46.94DB 
96.62DB 
77.96DB 
34.59DB 
10.20DB 
33.llDB 
235.99 
53.09DB 
17.41DB 
34.53DB 
36.70DB 
30.42DB 
314.70 
57.44DB 
48.35DB 
8.30DB 
61.61DB 
10.70DB 
10.70DB 
10.70DB 
20.89DB 
90.00DB 
59.47DB 
260.26 
67.13DB 
69.50DB 
45.00 
55.84DB 
10.70DB 
5.70DB 
0.44DB 
0.44DB 
0.44DB 
0.44DB 
8.00DB 
151.17 
85.18 
19.46 
300.42 
253.48 
156.86 
78.90 
44.31 
34.11 
1.00 
236.99 
183.90 
166.49 
131.96 
95.26 
64. 84 
379.54 
322.10 
273.75 
265.45 
203.84 
193.14 
182.44 
171. 74 
150.85 
60.85 
1. 38 
261.64 
194.51 
125.01 
170.01 
114.17 
103.47 
97.77 
97.33 
96.89 
96.45 
96.01 
88.01 
= IDOC TRUST 
---=-====== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES 
--=-====== 05/18/2011 = 
Doc No: 18593 Name: WOLFE, WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL 
TIER-C CELL-68 
Transaction Dates: 04/0l/2010-05/18/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
87.04 4424.41 4340.38 3.01 
--------------------------------TRANSACTIONS-------------------------------
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
12/27/2010 HQ0527580-011 
12/27/2010 HQ0527580-012 
01/04/2011 HQ0528425-009 
01/10/2011 II0529254-036 
01/10/2011 II0529297-006 
01/11/2011 HQ0529330-016 
01/17/2011 II0529953-024 
01/24/2011 II0530731-022 
01/31/2011 110531522-018 
02/03/2011 HQ0532205-009 
02/07/2011 110532501-036 
02/08/2011 II0532659-014 
02/14/2011 II0533321-029 
02/18/2011 HQ0533875-002 
02/21/2011 II0533932-028 
02/21/2011 II0533932-029 
02/22/2011 HQ0534082-002 
02/22/2011 II0534083-002 
02 23/2011 HQ0534214-007 
02 28/2011 110534718-029 
03 03/2011 HQ0535242-010 
03 07/2011 II0535585-036 
03/07/2011 II0535585-037 
03/14/2011 1I0536516-028 
03/21/2011 II0537191-028 
03/28/2011 II0537917-031 
04/04/2011 II0538945-037 
04/06/2011 HQ0539480-010 
04/11/2011 110539826-003 
04/11/2011 II0539869-038 
04/11/2011 II0539869-039 
04/18/2011 HQ0540778-009 
04/18/2011 II0540794-030 
04/25/2011 II0541477-028 
05/02/2011 110542157-029 
05/05/2011 HQ0542973-010 
05 09/2011 II0543265-003 
05 09/2011 II0543339-041 
05 09/2011 II0543339-042 
061-CK INMATE 
061-CK INMATE 
030- 1/2011 CI 
099-COMM SPL 
072-METER MAIL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
181806 
181805 
INC CI INCOME 
178923 
RTCP MO 
030- 2/2011 CI INC CI INCOME 
099-COMM SPL 
072-METER MAIL 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
066-CK HOBBY 
067-CK TX HQ534082 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
184172 
RTCP MO 
178915 
178915 
RTCP MO 
030- 3/2011 CI INC CI INCOME 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
030- 4/2011 CI INC CI INCOME 
072-METER MAIL 189324 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
061-CK INMATE 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
179201 
030- 5/2011 CI INC CI INCOME 
072-METER MAIL 188270 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
25 .-00DB 
25.00DB 
236.20 
57.39DB 
2.75DB 
25.00 
63.87DB 
30.55DB 
58.54DB 
230.97 
42.96DB 
5.95DB 
77.50DB 
20.00 
25.00DB 
22.62DB 
139.20DB 
6.96DB 
25.00 
35.15DB 
243.92 
63.28DB 
52.82DB 
59.47DB 
37.06DB 
18.82DB 
18.21DB 
284.03 
6.70DB 
66.43DB 
23.26DB 
100.00DB 
55.36DB 
22.36DB 
9.39DB 
225.40 
5.95DB 
10.20DB 
76.69DB 
63.01 
38.01 
274.21 
216.82 
214.07 
239.07 
175.20 
144.65 
86.11 
317.08 
274.12 
268.17 
190.67 
210.67 
185.67 
163.05 
23.85 
16.89 
41.89 
6.74 
250.66 
187.38 
134.56 
75.09 
38.03 
19.21 
1.00 
285.03 
278.33 
211.90 
188.64 
88.64 
33.28 
10.92 
1. 53 
226.93 
220.98 
210.78 
134.09 
= IDOC TRUST OFFENDER BANK BALANCES 
Doc No: 18593 Name: WOLFE, WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
Transaction Dates: 04/0l/2010-05/18/2011 
05/18/2011 = 
ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL 
TIER-C CELL-68 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
87.04 4424.41 4340.38 3.01 
============================TRANSACTIONS================================ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
----------
------------- ------------------ ---------- ---------- -----------
05/16/2011 II0544142-025 099-COMM SPL 17.02DB 117.07 
05/17/2011 HQ0544309-006 066-CK HOBBY 178920 108.lSDB 8.92 
05/17/2011 II0544310-006 067-CK TX HQ544309 178920 5.41DB 3.51 
05/18/2011 HQ0544549-001 079-STATEMENT 178921 O.SODB 3.01 
William Wolfe 
I .D.O.C. ia8593 
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A 
P.O. BOX 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Appellant 
DOC.KiTEo· 
IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
/Q , .22 FILED /\ --
. AT-'-'' O'CLOCK-1:1,__M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COUR1' OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO. 
Williai11 Wolfe 
Appellant 
Case No. CR-1982-18290 
VS. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Respondent 
-----------
COMES NOt-J, William Wolfe, Petitioner-Appellant in the above entitled 
matter and moves this Honorable Court to grant Appellant's Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel for the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the 
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 
1. Appellant is currently incarcerated within the Idaho 
Corrections under the direct care, custody and control of 
Smith, of the I.S.C.I. 
Department of 
warden Johanna 
2. The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the 
Appe1lant to properly pursue. Appellant lacks the knowledge and skill needed 
to represent himself. 
3. Appellant required assistance completing these pleading's, as he was unable 
to do it himself. 
DATED THIS _l__ day of June, 2011. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
William Wolfe, Deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am the affiant in the above-entitled case; 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL. pg-1 
000309 
2. I am currently residing at the I.S.C.I. under the care, custody and control 
of warden Johanna Smith. 
3. I am and do not have any funds to hire privot counsel; 
4. I am without bank accounts, stock, bonds, real estate or any other form of 
real property; 
5. I am unable to provide any other form of security; 
6. I am untrained in the law; 
7. If I am forced to proceed without counsel being appointed I will be 
unfairly handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the 
State; 
Further your affaint sayeth naught. 
hlHEREFOR, Appellant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court issue 
it 1 s Order granting Appellant's Motion for appointment of Counsel to represent 
his interest, or in the alternative grant any such relief to which it may 
appear the is entitled to. 
Dated this J' day of June, 2011. 
~~?v~ 
William Wolfe Appellant 
Witnessed : ~, /~ 
Witnessed By~~ 'iZZ.."~ 
( ,1 
Witnessed~~~~-;:, 
Dated 6-~-/ / 
------'----
Dated_. _4-____ -_5_-_/_/ __ 
Dated t- S:-1/ ___;:;;;;_ ____ _ 
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Uu·1u1:r: v -~ L 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5 day of June1 2011. I mailed a true and 
correct copy of this MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL for the purpose of filing with the court and of mailing a true and 
correct copy via prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to: 
~/~~ Wt1!d( 
William Wolfe 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID. 83720-0010 
Idaho County Prosecutor 
Idaho County Courthouse 
320 West MainAve. 
Grangeville1 ID. 83530 
Ur, u o· _ .., - · J.i l 
1 
2 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Jeff P. Payne 
Attorney at Law 
114 S. Idaho Avenue 
Grangeville, ID 83530 
Phone: (208) 983-0760 
ISB # 3966 
Attorney for: Plaintiff 
IDAHO COUNTr' DISTRICT COU~T ! . , F FIU:D [\ 
AT- l, IL2 OCLOCK_t:LM 
JUN 1 3 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR 18290 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) ORDER APPOINTING 
) SPECIAL PROSECUTOR 
) 
WILLIAM WOLFE, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
14 Having granted Jeff P. Payne's motion for change of special prosecutor in the above-entitled 
15 and numbered mater; 
16 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that :Jo"'>~vk ;'.). . GJ !'";_ k~ , is hereby 
17 appointed as Special Prosecutor in the above-entitled matter, in thtt he_yhe- is a suitable person to 
18 perform the duties of special prosecutor in this matter. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
DATED this 
ORDER APPOINTING 
28 SPECIAL PROSECUTOR 
---·--·----········· 
day of Cf' t....e- 20 it 
District Judge / 
UU031.2 
L _F..,--.._ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 
--.. 
JUN 13 2011 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plainti Case NO. CR 82-18290 
vs. 
William Wolf<.? 
Defendant. 
ORDER APPOINTING 
STATE APPELLATE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
WHEREAS, Defendant appeared before this Court on the charge of 
Murder; 
WHEREAS, Defendant was found guilty to and was duly convicted 
of that offense, and thereafter sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
by this Court on August 5, 1982; 
WHEREAS, Defendant has requested the aid of counsel in 
pursuing a direct appeal from this felony conviction, and has filed 
a Notice of Appeal (attached hereto); 
WHEREAS, Defendant has filed a Notice of Appeal (attached 
hereto) ; 
WHEREAS, this Court is satisfied that Defendant is a needy 
person entitled to the services of the State Appellate Public 
Defender (SAPD) pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-852, 19-854 and 19-
863A; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with Idaho Code§ 19-870, 
UU0313 
that the SAPD is appointed to represent Defendant in all matters as 
cated herein, or until relieved by an order of this Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Idaho County Public Defender as 
t al counsel shall remain as appointed counsel for the purpose of 
filing any motions in the District Court which, if granted, could 
affect the judgment or sentence in this action, such as those 
motions under Idaho Criminal Rules 35 and 36. Trial counsel shall 
remain as appointed counsel until such motions have been decided 
and the time for appeal thereof has run. If an appeal is taken 
from any of these motions, trial couns is further responsible for 
filing a notice of appeal and moving to have the SAPD appointed to 
pursue that appeal. 
Dated the ;:;;1-1 day of June 2011. 
UU03l~ 
Michael J./Griftin 
District Judge/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk, do hereby certify that I 
led a copy of the foregoing order to the following persons on 
lo-! o·! I 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703-6914 
Attorney General's Office 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Attn: Clerk 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
William Wolfe #18593 
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Kathy M. Ackerman, Clerk 
OUU3lv 
IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
. I, 'v "I';:~ A 
AT I , lo 6c~oc-<_. __ M_ 
JUN 1 3 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
State of Idaho 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
William Wolfe 
Defendant( s). 
) 
) 
) Case No. CR 82-18290 
) CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
) 
. ) 
) 
) 
I 1 the undersigned, a Deputy Court Clerk of the above-entitled court, do 
hereby certify that a copy of the Order Appointing Special Prosecutor filed in this case on 
June 13, 2011 was mailed or delivered by me on June 13, 2011 to: 
J.A. Wright, delivered to tray 
Kathy M. Ackerman, Clerk 
DE;PUty I 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
00031€ 
William Wolfe 
I.D.O.C. #18593 
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A 
P.O. BOX 14 
Boise1 Idaho 83707 
Defendant 
JUN ; 7 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO. 
li'Jilliam Wolfe 
Defendant 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________ ) 
Case No. CR-1982-18290 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COlJNSEL 
COMES NOW, William Wolfe, Defendant in the above entitled matter and 
moves this Honorable Court to grant Defendant's Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel for the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the Affidavit in 
Support of Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 
l. Defendant is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of 
Corrections under the direct care, custody and control of warden Johanna 
Smith, of the I.s.c.I. 
2. The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the 
Defendant to properly pursue. Defendant lacks the knowledge and skill needed 
to represent himself. 
3. Defendant required assistance completing these pleading's, as he was unable 
to do it himself. 
DATED THIS ~,,-/-'-3/_ day of June, 2011. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
William Wolfe, Deposes and says a.s follows: 
1. I~~ the affiant in the above-entitled case; 
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CE~TIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _d_ day of June, 2011. I mailed a true and 
correct copy of this MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL for the purpose of filing with the court and of mailing a true and 
correct copy via prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to: 
William Wolfe 
Idaho County Prosecutor 
Idaho County Courthouse 
320 West Main 
Grangeville ID. 93530 
Uuo ,.-, •, C J.lc: 
2. I am currently residing at the I.S.C.I. under the care, custody and control 
of warden Johanna Smith. 
3. I am indigent and do not have any funds to hire privot counsel; 
4-. I am without bank accounts, stock, bonds, real estate or any other form of 
r-eal property; 
5. I am unable to provide any other form of security; 
6. I am untrained in the law; 
7. If I a.'tl forced to proceed without counsel being appointed I will be 
unfairly handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the 
State; 
Further your affaint sayeth naught. 
WHEREFOR, Defendant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court issue 
it 1 s Order granting Defendant's Motion for appointment of Counsel to represent 
his interest, or in the alternative grant any such relief to which it may 
appear the Defendant is entitled to. 
Dated this /7 day of June, 2011. 
William Wolfe Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this /t/ 
June, 2011. 
I 
/7 II r11· i r-/ / /If // 
/ <:/'<,../1/(LI/A,1,1 ,,~ . 
Not,ar;f,i:P-ci{olic for Idaho /, I , _, 
Cofum{ssion expires: c.----/ 23 / WI 2.. 
I ! / 
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day of 
Williaw Wolfe 
I.D.O.C. H8593 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO. 
Wolfe 
Defendant 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff 
Case No. CR-1982-18290 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT 
OF CO(.J1;JSEL 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel is granted and a duly licensed 
attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby appointed to represent said 
Defendant in all proceedings involving the Idaho Cdwinal Rule 35 Motion. 
Dated this day of June, 2011. 
---
District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
OUU-.; .1r~ IJ ,_ L 
rvilliam Wolfe 
I.D.O.C. U8593 
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Defendant 
IUAHO COUN7Y DISTRICT COURT £! r "O FILE::' /J,. 
A 'Lf o c_c;c-< -il.M. 
JUN 1 7 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO. 
William Wolfe 
Defendant 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PLAINTIFF 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________ ) 
Case No. CR-1982-18290 
MOTION FOR HEARING 
COMES NOW, William Wolfe, Defendant, in the above entitled matter and 
moves this Honorable Court to grant Defendant's Motion for Hearing so that 
information and oral argument can be presented in support of the Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
vJHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court issues 
it's Order granting Defendant's Motion for Hearing. 
Dated this ff._ day of June, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / ;/ day of June, 2011. I delivered to 
prison authorities for the purpose of mailing a true and correct copy of the 
Motion For Hearing via prison mail system for process to the U.S. mail system 
to: 
MOTION FOR HEARING 
Idaho County Prosecutor 
Idaho County Courthouse 
320 West Main 
Grangeville ID. 93530 
oou·· ·-1>1· v,,.,., 
William Wolfe 
I. D.O. C. #18593 
I.S.C.I. Unit l3C-68A 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise1 Idaho 83707 
Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COl:JRT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT ·op 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO. 
r·Jilliam Wolfe 
Defendant 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________ ) 
Case No. CR-1982-18290 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR HEARING 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Hearing is granted 
so that information and oral argument can be presented in support of the Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 motion for correction of sentence. A hearing will be held at 
-------,------------- on the ___ day of ________ 1 2011. at 
_____ (time) ______ (tioe zone). The hearing will be held ___ in 
person or ___ by telephone. If by telephone the Court will initiate the 
phone call at a phone number provided by the IDOC paralegal. 
Dated this day.of , 2011. 
--- --------
District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING MO'I'ION FOR HEARING AND NOTICE OF HEARING. 
O"l t' UUJ22 
William Wolfe 
I.D.O.C. #18593 
I. S. C. I. Unit 13C-68A 
P.O. BOX 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Defendant 
IDAHO CO,UNTY D. 1ST. RICT AURT n · 1 I I FILED . 
ATVI ,.~ I O'CLC:-<_ ','. 
JUN 1 7 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO. 
William Wolfe 
Defendant 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
COIJNTY OF ADA ) 
Case No. CR-1982-18290 
MOTION Ai."'1D AFFIDAVIT FOR 
FEE WAIVER (PRISONER) 
Defendant asks to start or defend this case without fees, and swears under 
oath: 
1. This is an action for I.C.R. 35 Motion. 
2. I am unable to pay court costs. I verify that the statements made in this 
affidavit are true and correct. I understand that a false statement in this 
affidavit is perjury and I can be sent to prison for (1) one to (14) fourteen 
years. 
3. I have attached to this affidavit a current statement of my inmate account, 
certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the activity of the 
account over a period of the last 6 months. I understand that I am not an 
indigent prisoner, but I am a needy prisoner and am unable to pay fee's or to 
hire counsel to represent me. 
INDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE 
Name William Wolfe, I.D.O.C. U8593 
Address: I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A P.O. Box 14, Boise ID. 83707. 
Date of Birth
ASSETS 
I am without bank accounts, stocks, bonds, or any real or any other form of 
property. I am unable to offer any other form of security. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR FEE WAIVER (PRISONER) pg-1 
Dated this /,/ day of June, 2011. 
William rvolfe / 
r c:_/ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this / I day of June I 
2011. 
Notrary>'. uolic ~for Idaho/ / 
C6r,1mission expires: .:Z:1 2:.? . 2v i 3 
I I 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / 1/ day of June, 2011. I mailed a true and 
correct copy of this MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR FEE WAIVER (PRISONER) for the 
purpose of filing with the court and of mailing a true and correct copy via 
prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to: 
William Wolfe 7 
Idaho County Prosecutor 
Idaho County Courthouse 
320 West Main 
Grangeville ID. 93530 
0 U u'11 ') :::: v,:;., '-'· 
= IDOC TRUST--========= OFFENDER BANK BALANCES 
-========= 06/07/2011 = 
Doc No: 18593 Name: WOLFE, WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL 
TIER-C CELL-68 
Transaction Dates: 12/01/2010-06/07/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
60.85 1695.06 1929.75 295.54 
-=---------=-===================TRANSACTIONS--------------------------------
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
12/06/2010 II0524354-036 
12 06/2010 HQ0524371-009 
12 13/2010 II0525676-042 
12 13/2010 II0525676-043 
12 16/2010 HQ0526262-005 
12/19/2010 II0526605-042 
12/20/2010 II0526794-013 
12/20/2010 II0526794-015 
12/20/2010 II0526795-013 
12/22/2010 II0527197-001 
12/22/2010 II0527197-006 
12/22/2010 II0527208-004 
12/27/2010 II0527533-013 
12/27/2010 HQ0527580-011 
12/~7/2010 HQ0527580-012 
01/04/2011 HQ0528425-009 
01/i°0/2011 II0529254-036 
01/10/2011 II0529297-006 
01/11/2011 HQ0529330-016 
01/17/2011 II0529953 024 
01/24/2011 II0530731-022 
11/31/2011 II0531522-018 
02/03/2011 HQ0532205-009 
02/07/2011 II0532501-036 
02/08/2011 II0532659-014 
02/14/2011 II0533321-029 
02/18/2011 HQ0533875-002 
02/21/2011 II0533932-028 
02/21/2011 II0533932-029 
02/22/2011 HQ0534082-002 
02 22/2011 II0534083-002 
02 23/2011 HQ0534214-007 
02 28/2011 II0534718-029 
03/03/2011 HQ0535242-010 
03/07/2011 II0535585-036 
U3/07/2011 II0535585-037 
03/14/2011 II0536516-028 
63/21/2011 II053719l-028 
03/28/2011 II0537917-031 
099-COMM SPL 
030-12/2010 CI INC CI INCOME 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
072-METER MAIL 
072-METER MAIL 
072-METER MAIL 
072-METER MAIL 
072-METER MAIL 
072-METER MAIL 
071-MED CO-PAY 
061-CK INMATE 
061-CK INMATE 
RTCP MO 
169002 
179154 
181803 
181818 
181804 
181826 
407427 
181806 
181805 
030- 1/2011 CI INC CI INCOME 
099-COMM SPL 
072-METER MAIL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
178923 
RTCP MO 
030- 2/2011 CI INC CI INCOME 
099-COMM SPL 
072-METER MAIL 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
099 COMM SPL 
066-CK HOBBY 
067-CK TX HQ534082 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
184172 
RTCP MO 
178915 
178915 
RTCP MO 
030- 3/2011 CI INC CI INCOME 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
UUUJ>( .. 
• u..,j ,_ 
59.47DB 
260.26 
67.13DB 
69.50DB 
45.00 
55.84DB 
10.70DB 
5.70DB 
0.44DB 
0.44DB 
0.44DB 
0.44DB 
8.00DB 
25.00DB 
25.00DB 
236.20 
57. 39DB 
2.75DB 
25.00 
63.87DB 
30.55DB 
58.54DB 
230.97 
42.96DB 
5.95DB 
77.50DB 
20.00 
25.00DB 
22.62DB 
139.20DB 
6.96DB 
25.00 
35.15DB 
243.92 
63.28DB 
52.82DB 
59.47DB 
37.06DB 
18.82DB 
1. 38 
261.64 
194.51 
125.01 
170.01 
114.17 
103.47 
97.77 
97.33 
96.89 
96.45 
96.01 
88.01 
63.01 
38.01 
274.21 
216.82 
214.07 
239.07 
175.20 
144.65 
86.11 
317.08 
274.12 
268.17 
190.67 
210.67 
185.67 
163.05 
23.85 
16.89 
41.89 
6.74 
250.66 
187.38 
134.56 
75.09 
38.03 
19.21 
= IDOC TRUST=-========= OFFENDER BANK BALANCES 
-========= 06/07/2011 = 
Doc No: 18593 Name: WOLFE, WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL 
TIER-C CELL-68 
Transaction Dates: 12/01/2010-06/07/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
60.85 1695.06 1929.75 295.54 
'==============-=================TRANSACTIONS================================ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
----------
------ ------
04/04/2011 II0538945-037 
04/06/2011 HQ0539480-010 
04/11/2011 II0539826-003 
04/11/2011 II0539869-038 
04/11/2011 II0539869-039 
04/18/2011 HQ0540778-009 
04/18/2011 II0540794-030 
04/25/2011 II0541477 028 
05/02/2011 II0542157-029 
05/05/2011 HQ0542973-010 
05/09/2011 II0543265-003 
05/09/2011 II0543339-041 
05/09/2011 II0543339-042 
05/16/2011 II0544142-025 
,o 5 / 1 7 / 2 011 HQ0544309-006 
.05/1 7/2011 ·tro~44310 -o o 6 
:05 / 18 / 2 011 HQ0544549-001 
05/25/2011 HQ0545110-005 
.05 / 31/ 2011 II0545545-047 
,o 6 I o 6 I 2 o 11 HQ0546326-008 
06/06/2011 II0546413-055 
06/07/2011 II0546533-003 
------------------ ---------- ---------- -----------
099-COMM SPL 18.21DB 1.00 
030- 4/2011 CI INC CI INCOME 284.03 285.03 
072-METER MAIL. 189324 6.70DB 278.33 
099-COMM SPL 66.43DB 211.90 
099-COMM SPL 23.26DB 188.64 
061-CK INMATE 179201 100.00DB 88.64 
099-COMM SPL 55.36DB 33.28 
099-COMM SPL 22.36DB 10.92 
099-COMM SPL 9.39DB 1. 53 
030- 5/2011 CI INC CI INCOME 225.40 226.93 
072-METER MAIL 188270 5.95DB 220.98 
099-COMM SPL 10.20DB 210.78 
099-COMM SPL 76.69DB 134.09 
099-COMM SPL 17.02DB 117.07 
066-CK HOBBY 178920 108.lSDB 8.92 
067-CK TX HQ544309 178920 5.41DB 3.51 
079-STATEMENT 178921 0.50DB 3.01 
011-RCPT MO/CC RTCP MO 40.00 43.01 
099-COMM SPL 29.17DB 13.84 
030- 6/2011 CI INC CI INCOME 293.97 307.81 
099-COMM SPL 11.87DB 295.94 
072-METER MAIL 181827 0.40DB 295.54 
ST.ATE OP IDAOO 
' .• ,....., ,,._. + ,.( ,·;;-·: ' •• ,· -;c·.,• .... ~ •. :_' 
~ ~51 zyf ~1i 
1 
~~'.b,;J certify 1!oo1t ~ foregoing is a fulf, ttir-~ ffl'i& 
co11!'.eci OOJPY of an instrumell]t as the same now re~ 
o;rn fire allld! of reoordl in my office. 111 
WITNESS my hand hereto affixed this 7 ___. 
®1<>1'..-~,~ AD..20..LL 
By_·=· -=-·----.. ~~~.QY,.~L_ ___ _ 
,, u· u ,. , ,... u J~t 
' IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT . 9.' ,1 · Fil::D {\ l 
AT 14D O CLOCK _.CL.M. ' 
William Wolfe 
I.D.O.C. #18593 
I.S.C.I. Unit l3C-68A 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Defendant 
JUN 1 7 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO. 
t·villiam Wolfe 
Defendant 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
-----------
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-1982-18290 
MOTION FOR CORRECTION 
OF SENTENCE, ICR 35 
COMES NOW, William Wolfe, Defendant in the instant action, and pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, moves this honorable Court for its Order: 
Correcting the Defendant's illegal sentence. 
1. The Defendant was convicted of first degree murder before the Honorable 
Judge George Reinhardt and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the custody 
of the Idaho Department of Corrections for: 
A fixed term of life. 
2. The Defendant has been incarcerated since February 20th, 
served 29 years & 4 months of the sentence: 
3. The Defendant believes: 
1982. and has 
The sentence is illegal and should be changed on the following grounds: 
Mr. Wolfe claims that the State did not have "Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction" in this matter because of the following: 
l. The incident happened in Stites Idaho, which is located on the Nez Perce 
indian reservation ( See Exhibit "A", map produced by the Nez Perce tribe 
wildlife program, using ARC/Info.). Also in State V. Rittel, MR. Rittel was 
charged with a felony that occurred in Stites Idaho. (See Exhibit "B", 
criminal complaint State V. Ri ttel.) 
In State V. Ri ttel the Idaho County prosecuting attorney, Kirk A. 
MacGreagor ISB#3880 filed a Motion To Dismiss Without Prejudice, stating the 
reason for this as; Mr. Rittel is an enrolled member of a recognized native 
American tribe and the crime occurred within the boundary of the Nez Perce 
Indian reservation and accordingly the District Court of Idaho County lacked 
"Subject Matter Jurisdiction" of the Defendant. (See Exhibit "E", State V. 
Rittel, Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice). 
MOTION FOR CORRECTION OF SENTENCE, ICR 35 pg-1 
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In U.S.A. V. RHtel: the U.S. DISTRICT Court stipulates as to Mr. Rittel's 
indian blood and the place of the offense. ( See Exhibit "D", U.S.A. V. 
Rittel, pg-6, item #65 ). 
2. Scott Gold was an enrolled member of a recognized tribe. ( See Exhibit "C", 
tribal enrollment of Scott Gold ) . Also the court has Mr. Golds medical and 
military records, which are sealed to the court, thus showing further proof of 
Mr. Gold's indian status. Pleas take Judicial note of these records to. 
3. Under the treaty of 1963 with the Nez Perce tribe, (Also known as the Major 
Crime Act) This treaty governs the jurisdiction issues between the tribe, 
State, and Federal government's. 
In the Act it shows that the offences listed in§ 1153 Title 18, United 
States Code, commonly known as the ten Major Crimes, which includes murder, 
shall remain under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. ( See Exhibit 
"F", Resolution, pg-2, paragraph l ) . Also in U.S.A. V. Bruce the United 
States 9th circuit Court of Appeals further defines " Who is an indian" ( See 
Exhibit "G", U.S.A V. Bruce, pg. 1-2, Items #4 & #6 ) in U.S.A. V. Bruce the 
9th circuit Court of Appeals also discusses who fall under Federal 
jurisdiction on an indian reservation. ( See Exhibit "G", pg. 4-6, Discussion 
) In U.S.A. V. Bruce the Court says, "Crimes in which the victim, but not the 
perpetrator, is indian are subject to (a) Federal jurisdiction under § 1152, 
as well as pursuant to Federal criminal law of general applicability. ( See 
Exhibit "G", pg. 6, item ,n ) . 
4. In a recent opinion of the Idaho State Supreme Court, state V. Lute. (See 
Exhibit "H", State V. Lute ) Mr Lute filed a rule 35 Motion for Correction of 
an illegal sentence. In it he is claiming the State did not have Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Lute and vacated 
his conviction. Showing that Mr. Wolfer s claim that the State did not have 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction can be brought through this Rule 35 Motion for 
Correction of an illegal sentence. 
HHEREFORE, the Defendant, William Wolfe, respectfully prays the Honorable 
Court to correct the sentence as follows: 
Vacate Mr. Wolfe's conviction or grant such other and further relief, as the 
Court deems appropriate. 
respectfully submitted this _/!j__ day of June, 2011. 
u/.t//2$/'r pt/~ 
William Wolfe Defendant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / day of June, 2011. I delivered to 
prison authorities for the purpose of 'mailing a true and correct copy of the 
MOTION FOR CORRECTION OF SENTENCE, ICR 35 via prison mail system for 
processing to the U.S. mail system to: 
Idaho County Prosecutor 
Idaho County Courthouse 
320 West Main 
Grangeville ID. 93530 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 11 l) < ~ '\'I(.-,, .. ) Case No. l#\ 0.-.)~ .,j/)if--.'°:) (.; 
Plaintiff, ) 
) CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 
vs. ) 
) 
) 
WILLIAM DANIEL RITTEL, ) 
) 
Defendant. ' } 
A ,,,,,,-
~-
PERSONALLY APPEARED before me this /<1<t._ day of .Aftgllst, 2005, Idaho County 
Prosecuting Attorney, KIRK A. MacGREGOR, who being duly sworn, on oath, complains and says: 
On or about December 18, 2005, in the County of Idaho, State of Idaho, the crime of 
That the Defendant, on or about the 18th day of December, 2005, in Stites, County of 
Idaho, State ofldaho, did unla\\rfully and maliciously bite off a portion of the ear of 
JARROD CARTER, a human being, permanently disfiguring the sai_d JARROD 
CARTER, a felony in violationofidaho Code Section 18-5001. 
contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute. in such case made and provided, and against the 
peace and dignity of the State ofldaho, and this Complainant, upon oath, accuses the said defendant 
of having committed such crimes and prays that he · e dealt with according to law. 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - 1 
KIRK A. MacGREGOR, ISB#3880 
Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of December, 2005. 
JUDGE / 11 
./ r 
CRlMINAL COMPLAINT - 2 
'Ifie tB{aclifeet 6£-riGt -
ef 
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(406} 338-7524 
iN REPLY REFER TO: 
ENROLL'v'!EN, 
! hereby certify that the following named individual is listed on the official records of this o'iiice: 
GOLD. SCOTT RI CHARD 
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Internal Use. Only 
Case title: USA v. Rittel Date Filed: 07/18/2006 
Date Terminated: 10/12/2006 
------------------ ··--·----·--··----------·-- -·········- ··-· ·- -···· ·-·--··· ., ... 
Assigned to: Honorable Edward J. Lodge 
Defendant 
William D Rittel (1) 
TERMINATED: 10/12/2006 
Pending Counts 
None 
Highest Offense Level (Opening) 
None 
Terminated Counts 
represented by James Edward Siebe 
SIEBE LAW OFFICES 
PO Box 9045 
Moscow, ID 83 843 
(208) 883-0622 
Fax: 1-208-882-8769 
Email: jsiebe@moscow.com 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Designation: CJA Appointment 
Kathleen Moran 
FEDERAL DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
10 N Post St #700 
00033 .. 
Spokane, WA 99210 
(509) 624-7606 
Fax: 1-509-747-3539 
Email: kailey_moran@fd.org 
TERMINATED: 08/21/2006 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
Designation: CJA Appointment 
Disposition 
Disposition 
8/3/2007 11 :40 AM 
,f7 
ASSAULT RESlJLTING IN S~RlOUS 
BODILY INJURY Not Guilty 
(1) 
Highest Offense Level (Terminated) 
Felony 
Complaints 
None 
Plaintiff 
USA 
Date Filed 
07/18/2006 
07/20/2006 
08/04/2006 
08/04/2006 
08/04/2006 
08/08/2006 
# 
<.i} 1 
<.i}2 
133 
Q4 
'35 
~6 
Disposition 
represented by Joshua B. Taylor 
United States Attorney's Office 
205 N. 4th Street 
Room306 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
(208) 667-6568 
Fax: (208) 667-0814 
Email: josh.taylor@ag.idaho.gov 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Docket Text 
INDICTMENT (Notice sent to USP & USM) as to William D Rittel (1) 
count(s) 1. (Attachments:# l Cover Sheet#; Foreperson's signature) Ga,) 
(Entered: 07/20/2006) 
*SEALED* Arrest Warrant Issued in case as to William D Rittel. (Notice 
sent to USM) Ga,) 
MOTION to Quash WARRANT AND ISSUE SUMMONS by USA as to 
William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua) 
ORDER granting l Motion to Quash warrant and to issue summons (Notice 
sent to USM) as to William D Rittel (1). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. 
( caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on 
the Notice of Electronic Fili~g (NEF) by dks,) 
Summo:i:is Issued in case as to William D Rittel Arraignment/Initial 
Appearance set for 8/14/2006 03:30 PM in Moscow, ID before Honorable 
Larry M. Boyle. (dks,) 
Arrest Warrant Returned Unexecuted in case as to William D Rittel. (wm,) 
(Entered: 08/09/2006) 
UUUJ3l 
8/3/2007 11 :40 AM 
OR/1 L.1.nnnh 
,._,....,, "'- 11 ~VVV ~7 Minute Entry for proceeding~ held before Judge La..'1}' M. Boyle 
:Arraignment as to William D Rittel (1) Count 1 held on 8/14/2006 Plea 
entered Not Guilty (Notice sent to USP & USM), Initial Appearance held on 
8/14/2006 Plea entered Not Guilty (Notice sent to USP & USM) Jury Trial 
set for 10/10/2006 09:30 AM in Coeur d Alene, ID before Honorable 
Edward J. Lodge. (Cow'i Reporter Nancy Persinger.) (le, ) (Entered: 
08/15/2006) 
08/14/2006 ~8 CJA 23 Financial Affidavit by William D Rittel (dks,) (Entered: 
08/15/2006) 
08/14/2006 ~9 PROCEDURAL ORDER as to William D Rittel . Signed by Judge Larry M. 
Boyle. ( caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses 
listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks,) (Entered: 
08/15/2006) 
08/14/2006 ~10 ORDER Setting Conditions of Release as to William D Rittel (1) PR (Notice 
-
sent to USP & USM). Signed by Judge Larry M. Boyle. (caused to be 
mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of 
Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks, ) (Entered: 08/15/2006) 
08/14/2006 (Court only) Terminate Deadlines and Hearings as to William D Rittel: arr 
held 8/14/06 Ga) (Entered: 08/16/2006) 
08/14/2006 (Court only) ***Procedural Interval start P2 8/14/06 as to William D Rittel 
Ga, ) (Entered: 08/16/2006) 
08/16/2006 ~11 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S 
-
DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
08/16/2006 ()12 MOTION for Discovery GOVERNMENT'S DISCOVERY REQUEST by 
-
USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua) 
08/16/2006 ()13 Summons Returned Unexecuted in case as to William D Rittel (Notice sent 
-
to USP) Ga) 
08/17/2006 ()14 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S 
-
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
08/21/2006 ()15 MOTION CJA Appointment by William D Rittel. (Moran, Kathleen) 
08/21/2006 ~16 ORDER granting J1 Motion for CJA Counsel as to William D Rittel (1). 
-
CJA Attorney James Siebe substituted for Kathleen Moran. Signed by Judge 
Edward J. Lodge. ( caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the 
addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by ja,) (emailed to 
J. Siebe by ja). 
08/24/2006 <;) 17 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S 
- SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
08/30/2006 (;JJ 8 RESPONSE by dft William D Rittel to Discovery (Siebe, James) 
08/31/2006 ~19 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S 
-
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
)f7 000337 8/3/2007 11 :40 AM 
-09/06/2006 Q20 M ION in Limine by Wiiliam D Rittel. (Siebe, Ja.'11es) 
-
09/11/2006 ¼121 Proposed Jury Instructions by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) 
-
09/11/2006 Q22 MOTION to Vacate and Continue Trial Setting by William D Rittel. (Siebe, 
-
James) 
09/11/2006 ¼123 MOTION in Limine by USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua) 
-
09/11/2006 Q24 MOTION in Limine by USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua) 
-
09/11/2006 Q25 MOTION in Limine by USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua) 
-
09/13/2006 Q26 MEMORANDUM in Opposition by William D Rittel re 24 MOTION in 
-
Limine, 25 MOTION in Limine, 23 MOTION in Limine (Siebe, James) 
09/14/2006 Q27 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Motion for Vacation and Continuance of Trial 
-
Setting by William D Rittel re 22 MOTION to Vacate and Continue Trial 
Setting (Siebe, James) 
09/15/2006 Q28 Sealed Document (Attachments:# l # l # J # i)(Siebe, James) 
-
09/15/2006 Q CORRECTIVE ENTRY -The entry docket number 27 Notice (Other) filed 
by William D Rittel, was filed using the incorrect docket event. The filing 
party shall re-submit their filing using "Withdrawal of Motion" located 
under Other Documents. Ga,) 
09/15/2006 Q29 WITHDRAWAL of Motion by William D Rittel re 22 MOTION to Vacate 
-
and Continue Trial Setting filed by William D Rittel, (Siebe, James) 
09/18/2006 Q30 
-
EXP ARTE ORDER as to William D Rittel re 28 Sealed Document (Notice 
sent to USM) (SEALED). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. Ga,) 
09/18/2006 (Court only) ***Staff Notes as to William D Rittel: subpoenas issued & 
given to USMS as per Court's Order dkt #30 Ga,) 
09/18/2006 (Court only) ***Staff Notes as to William D Rittel: mailed ex parte order 
dkt #30 to James Siebe Ga,) 
09/19/2006 Q31 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S 
-
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
09/20/2006 Q32 
-
REPLY TO RESPONSE to Motion by USA as to William D Rittel re 24 
MOTION in Limine, 25 MOTION in Limine, 23 MOTION in Limine 
(Taylor, Joshua) 
09/21/2006 ~33 Sealed Document (Attachments:# l)(Siebe, James) 
09/22/2006 ~34 EX PARTE ORDER (SEALED) as to William D Rittel re 33 Sealed 
-
Document (Notice sent to· USM). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. 
09/22/2006 (Court only) ***Staff Notes as to William D Rittel: issued subpoena and 
gave to USMS for service (SEALED) Ga,) 
09/25/2006 Q35 TRIAL BRIEF by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) 
of7 000338 8/3/2007 11 :40 AM 
. 
09/25/2006 <l36 RE.__PONSE to Motion by USA as to vVilliam D Rirtel re 20 MOTION in 
-
Limine (Taylor, Joshua) 
09/29/2006 ()37 Docket Entry NOTICE OF HEARING as to William D Rittel (Notice sent to 
USP & USM) PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the TIME for the Jury Trial set 
for Tuesday, October 10, 2006 in Coeur d Alene, Idaho before the Honorable 
Edward J. Lodge, HAS BEEN CHANGED from 9:30 am to 1 :30pm. 
( caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on 
the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by cv, ) 
10/02/2006 ()3g RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rirtel GOVERNMENT'S 
-
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
10/03/2006 ()39 Sealed Document (Attachments:# l)(Siebe, James) 
10/03/2006 Q40 RESPONSE by dft William D Rittel to Discovery (Supplemental) (Siebe, 
-
James) 
10/03/2006 Q41 EXHIBIT LIST by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) 
-
10/03/2006 Q42 Proposed Jury Instructions by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) 
-
10/03/2006 Q43 Proposed Voir Dire by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) 
-
10/03/2006 Q44 TRIAL BRIEF by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) 
-
10/03/2006 ()45 EXHIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) 
-
10/03/2006 Q46 EY....HIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) 
10/04/2006 ()47 EXP ARTE ORDER as to William D Rittel re 39 Sealed Document (Notice 
-
sent to USM) (SEALED). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. Ga) Modified 
on 10/4/2006 (ks): copy emailed to J. Siebe. 
10/04/2006 ()43 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S 
-
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
10/04/2006 (Court only) ***Staff Notes as to William D Rittel: Certified copy of Order 
#4 7 provided to USM; Subpoena provided to USM by J. Angelo (ks) 
10/04/2006 ()49 EXHIBIT LIST by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) 
10/04/2006 Q50 Proposed Voir Dire by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) 
-
10/04/2006 @51 Objection by William D Rittel to 43 Proposed Voir Dire filed by USA, 
(Siebe, James) 
10/04/2006 Q52 Objection by William D Rittel to 42 Proposed Jury Instructions filed by 
-
USA, (Siebe, James) 
10/05/2006 ()53 MOTION for Individual Voir Dire by William D Rittel. (Siebe, James) 
10/05/2006 ()54 Proposed Jury Instructions by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) 
10/05/2006 ()55 WITNESS LIST by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) 
10/06/2006 ·@56 Proposed Jury Instructions by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) 
)f7 000339: 8/3/2007 11 :40 AM 
J.- ··_r-- ... ., -- ,.,...,>w_.. • v-.;..,;v-J..J_..J..J..J _V ... 1 
' 
10/09/2006 Qc'"l EXHIBIT LIST by USA as to Wiiliam D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) ""'.; I 
-
10/09/2006 @58 WITNESS LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) 
10/10/2006 Q59 Proposed Jury Instructions by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) 
-
10/10/2006 @65 STIPULATION as to dft's Indian blood and place of offense by USA Glg, ) 
~ '- -r.:::-- (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/10/2006 Q66 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge :Pretrial 
-
Hearing as to William D Rittel held on 10/10/2006, granted 20 MOTION in 
Limine filed by William D Rittel, gra.nted 53 MOTION for Individual Voir 
Dire filed by William D Rittel. Stipulation 65 put on the record. (Court 
Repo1ier Lisa Yant.) Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/10/2006 Q67 Sealed Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge 
-
:Voir Dire begun on 10/10/2006 William D Rittel (1) on Count 1, Jury 
Selection as to William D Rittel held on 10/10/2006 (Court Reporter Lisa 
Yant.) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/10/2006 @68 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge :Jury Trial 
- (Day 1) as to William D Rittel held on 10/10/2006 (Court Reporter Lisa 
Yant.) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/11/2006 Q69 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge: Jury 
-
Trial (Day 2) as to William D Rittel held on 10/11/2006 (Court Reporter 
Lisa Yant.) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/12/2006 Q70 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge :Jury Trial 
- (Day 3 - Final Day) as to William D Rittel held on 10/12/2006. Defendant 
found not guilty. (Court Reporter Lisa Yant.) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/12/2006 'l71 WITNESS LIST by USA as to William D Rittel Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/12/2006 @72 EXHIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/12/2006 <;;j73 WITNESS LIST by William D Rittel Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
-
10/12/2006 Q74 EXHIBIT LIST by William D Rittel Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
-
10/12/2006 @75 Jury Instructions as to William D Rittel Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/12/2006 Q76 JURY VERDICT as to William D Rittel (1) Not Guilty on Count 1. (Notice 
-
sent to USP) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/12/2006 <,77 JUDGMENT of Acquittal as to William D Rittel (1), Count(s) 1, Not Guilty 
- (Notice sent to USP and USM). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. (caused 
to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the 
Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by jlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/13/2006 ~60 Subpoena Returned Un-Executed, Service un-exexuted as to Bernie York 
Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/13/2006 ()61 Subpoena Returned Executed served Janie Wilkins on 10/4/2006. (Notice 
-
sent to USM) G lg, ) {Entered: 10/16/2006) 
of7 8/3/2007 11 :40 AM 
-10/1 V?OOf; Qi:;'") Subpoena Returned Executed served Coiieen Baker on 10/4/2006. (Notice -v,:;.,; 
-
sent to USM) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/13/2006 Q63 Subpoena Returned Executed served Brian Wilkins on 10/4/2006. (Notice 
-
sent to USM) Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/13/2006 Q64 Subpoena Returned Executed served MaryAnn York on 10/4/2006. (Notice 
-
sent to USM) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/23/2006 ()73 Subpoena Returned Executed served Missy Clark on I 0/6/2006. (Notice sent 
-
to USM) Glg,) (Entered: 10/25/2006) 
03/23/2007 ()79 CIA 20 as to William D Rittel: Appointment of Attorney James Edward 
-
Siebe for William D. Rittel. Signed by Judge Larry M. Boyle. Glg,) 
(Entered: 03/26/2007) 
8/3/2007 11 :40 AM 
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! ROSE ~EHRING . 
\ Q"" C1-fi:£l_KAF ED. :rR!CT COURT 
!\,-h~L&r.\ .. _\-1.---~ ' ·~ DEPU1Y __ 
IN THE DISTRICT COD"RT OF THE SECON'D JlJDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
vs. 
Case No. CROS-30850 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
14 WILLIAM DANIEL RITTEL, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 15 Defendant. 
16 
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COMES NOW, KIRK A. MacGREGOR, Prosecuting Attorney in and for Idaho County, and 
moves the Court to dismiss without prejudice the above entitled case on the grounds and for the 
reasons that the above named defendant, WILLIAM DANIEL RITTEL, is an enrolled member of a 
recognized Native American Tribe and the crime occurred within the boundaries of the NezPerce 
Indian Reservation and accordingly Idaho County lacks jurisdiction of the defendant. 
DATED this lZ day of January, 2006. / 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE - I 
L 
~J'.:.;.cGREGOR, ISB#3880 
Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney 
0003~2 
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2 The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served 
upon the following person(s) in the manner indicated below on the 17 day of January, 2006: 
3 
4 James Edward Siebe 
Attorney at Law 
5 PO Box 9045 
Moscow, ID 83843 
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MOTION TO DISMISS 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE ~ 2 
U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered __ Courthouse Tray 
Via Facsimile 
--=/~--
/ 
KIRK A. MacGREGOR, ISB#3880 
Uuo ,,'') J '.t I.., 
·7. ·7· . . "i \l/.,.· -· 
:~-... . .;_:~ ~ i .. 
~ '~. 
NP 65-125 
~ 
~- Q . . 
WHER EASl the Nez Perce Tribal Execulive Committee has been empowered to act 
for and in c,ehalf of lhe Nez Perce Tribe, pursuant to lhe Revised Constitution and 
By-Laws, adopted by the General Council of lhe Nez Perce·Tribe, on May 6, 1961 
and approved by the Act1ng Commissioner of Indian Affairs, on June 27, 1961; and 
_ \l/HER.EAS, by Act. of August 15, 1963, Public Law 280, 83rd Congress, First Session, 
the United St.ates consented lo the exercise of criminal and civil jur_isdiction by the .. 
States over Indians and Indian reservations, and 
WHEREAS, by Chapter 58, Laws of 1963, State oi Idaho, the ;state of Idaho assumes 
and accepts jurisdiction for the civil and criminal enforcement of State laws a.'ld ·:requ-
1.aUons concernLr1g comnulsory school attendance; juvenile delinquency and youth 
rehabilitation; dependent, neglected and abused children; insa."'1ities and mental illness; 
public assistance; domestic relations; and op:::ration.and management of mot.or U::hlcles 
upon highways and roads maLr1talned by th_~ cqurity or.. state, or political sub::livLsions 
thereof, Lri Ind i.an country within the State·;' as Indian country is deiined by Title 181 
Section 1151, United State~ Code1 and ·, . 
WFEREAS, by Section 2 of Chapter 58 the State of Ida.ho obligates and bLr1ds ilseli to 
the assumption of such additional jurisdiction as is determined by a resolution of t..11€ 
tribal qo-v-ernL11g bcdy and becomes effective UIX)n the Tril:-€ rs transmittal of the reso-
lution to t.I-1e Attorney General oi the St.ale of Idaho, and 
WHEREAS1 the Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee is the duly constituled govern-
.,.,-,~ :.ng body 01 the Nez Perce Tribe, and · · . ·: 
. ... . . . ,. . 
, 
WHEREAS, the Indians residi...r1g on·the Nez Perce Indian Reservation in Lewis, Nez 
.Perce, Clearwater, and Idaho- Counties in the State of Idaho, acting through the Nez 
Perce Tribal Executive .Committee, their governing body duly recognized by the Bure.a: 
of fodian Affairs, are desirous at ll-iis tinie of having the State of Idaho assu.r:ne a.11d 
·exercise concurrent crimi.n.al jurisdiction over offenses qther than those commonly 
_· known ·as tp.e major_ crimes, committed by Indians residing o_n' the reservation, and 
~ 
- ., 
WHEREAS, '"the Nez Perce Tribe of Idaho r-...a.s Treaty rigt.t:: to fish at usual and accus-
tomed pl.aces, along wit....1-i hunting rights_ . . · · 
NCW, THEREFORE1 BE IT RESOLVED, by the Nez Perce Tribal E:secuUve Corrmitte€ 
the governing body of the· Nez Perce Indi?,n Reservation, in the aforesaid counties o-f th, 
State of Ida.ho, at a. duly constituted meetina of said Comrr.i lt<2e, that consent is given. tc 
,'.Jhe assumption ·by lhe State oi Idaho of conc:_urrent criminal jurisdiction within the Nez 
··Perc,e Ind i.2..i:i R~-~:.r"'.ation over the following o:tfe.ns·es: ·.-· · · ' -~. ·. · 
Drunkncss, Dislurbing the peace, :Conlribuli~g· to th~: dei.inqui:ncy of a. 
minor, Procuring intoxicant:; for r..inors, Simple a:;:.;au1t, Batt~ry,. Kid-· 
napping, Embezzlement, Fraud, Forgery, 'IZeceivinq ~tolen pro~rtJ, ·. · 
Extortion, Indecency and obscenity, Vagrar.cy, Tre:..:.:.p;.1ssi:lg and IJE.llcious 
injuries to properr.y, Public nuisance and al::::alement U:c:::-eof, Cruelty to 
anlmals, and carrying concealed and dangerous weapons in pLlblic places 
(t.he carr1ing of firearms in- pursuit of treaty hur.tir.g rights expressly· · .... ·· .:··· . ,· 
excluded). 
APPEND@Jf) @') / ./ 
' . ,j ':t ;i: 
•. 
- ·-~. • -:.· .... • • .1,.,,,,, 
~B-~;fr.rFURTHER~· . L.Y.~P,~~~1t:ll~~~~.i.~~~~ei_~~.rsie· :- .Sectiof:-1.1~3/ Tille,18, 
United ~~es Cs,d7, ·1:ommonly ·kno?Jn .. ~~-~he .t -: ajor::<;:t:JDJ?~, L e.~murder, '-'man-0 slaughter:, ... rape,;---rnce-sl1 assault wtth mlen to kill, assuall with a dangerous weapon, 
~ar~on;--, burglr1.ry;-,i.robbery, anc}.ilarceny; and ... mbezzlement or theft of fonds or 
properly of 2.n Indlan tribal o:rg:inization as provided by Federal law, shall remain 
under lhe jurisdiction of the Federa.1 Government until such time as the Nez Perce 
Tribal Executive Committee shall enact an appropriate resolution expressing the de-
sire of the people of the Nez Perce Reservation that the Slate of Idaho accept additional 
· criminal jurisdiction ~f such crimes, and. · · 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVE[?, that the ·Nez Perse Tribe retains jurisdiction· over all · 
ofien.ses over which it may presently exercise criminal jurisdiction through enactment. 
of an appropriate Law and Order Code, and ···, 
BE. IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that this resoiutlon expressing the desire oi the people 
of the Nez Parc.e Indian Reservatton to accept the criminal jurisdiction of the St.ate of . 
Idaho, as herein provided, be forwarded lo the Attorney General of the St.ate of Idaho, 
pursuant to Chapter 58, Laws of 1963, enac.ted by th2 Legislature of lhe S~le of Idaho 
on }..,farch 61 1063, and · · · · :-~ =-·. . 
· ...... ~ ..... 
BE IT FURTH SR RESOLVED1· that nothi.hg ~:.this resolution shall be construed as an 
?,brcga_tion of Section 3, Chapter 58, Laws of 1963, the State oi Idaho •. 
. . 
CERTIFICATION 
-------------.. 
. -fJ,The foregoing resolution was duly adopted by the Nez Perce Tribal Executive Commit-
•· ti::-e meeting i1;. regular session on the 13th day of April, 1965, at Lapwai, Idaho. 
. . . / 
-/I\ 
.,.. 
.... , 
. . -· . 
..... 
U.S. voijH~dshed by U.S. v. Maogi, 9th Cir.(Mont.l, March 16, 2010 
United Statestilurt of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. January 13, 2005 394 F.3d 1215 05 Cal. Daily Op. SeN. 379 
~: Original Image of 394 F.3d 1215 (PDF; 
394 F.3d 1215 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
UNITED STATES of l1.merica, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Violet BRUCE, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 03-:30171. Argued and Submitted March 4, 2004. Filed ,Jan. 13, 2005. 
Synopsis 
Background: Defendant was convicted, in the United States District Court for the 
District of Montana, Sam E. Haddon, J., of simple assault on Indian child on reservation. 
She appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Bybee, Circuit Judge. held that: 
'. defendant satisfied burden of production on her affirmative defense that she was 
Indian, and 
~: trial court's failure to let jury consider defense was not harmless error. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Rymer, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes (9) 
Change View 
Indians Appeal 
District court's determination of criminal defendant's Indian status is mixed 
question of law and fact, reviewed de novo. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152. 
2 Criminal Law Mixed Questions of Law and Fact 
Criminal Law Review De Novo 
"Mixed questions of law and fact," which are subject to de novo review, are 
those in which historical facts are admitted or established, rule of law is 
undisputed, and issue is whether facts satisfy statutory standard. 
3 Indians Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
G 
Criminal defendant's Indian status is affirmative defense, in prosecution under 
statute which contains exception for crime committed by Indian against Indian 
victim; defendant must come forward with enough evidence of her Indian 
status to permit fact-finder to decide issue in her favor, though government 
retains ultimate burden of persuading fact-finder that exception is 
inapplicable. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
Indians Who Is an Indian; Tribal Status 
Test for person's Indian status considers (1) person's degree of Indian blood; 
and (2) tribal or government recognition of person as Indian. 
RELATED TOPICS 
Offenses and Prosecutions 
lndiJn Countty Genern! Crl!'nina! Laws cf 
United Stares 
True Boundaries of Indian Reservation 
Criminal Law 
Review 
Present fvlixed Ques1J,On$ of Fact and 
L~w 
cc ir 
£xh:J;,,~ (; 1 
https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I5e26959479ecl ld99c4dbb2f0352441dNiew/FullTe... 6/7/2011 
7 Cases that cite this headnote 
5. Indians Who Is an Indian; Tribal Status 
Evidence of a parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent who is clearly 
identified as Indian is generally sufficient to satisfy "Indian blood" prong of test 
for Indian status. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
Indians Who Is an Indian; Tribal Status 
Factors court considers, in declining order of importance, when analyzing 
··tribal or government recognition" prong of test for Indian status are: (1) tribal 
enrollment; (2) receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians; (3) enjoyment of 
benefits of tribal affiliation; and (4) social recognition as Indian through 
residence on reservation and participation in Indian social life. 
9 Cases that cite this headnote 
7 indians Who Is an Indian; Tribal Status 
Defendant charged with assaulting Indian satisfied burden of production on 
her affirmative defense that she was Indian, within meaning of charging 
statute's exception for crimes committed by Indians against Indian victims; 
defendant was one-eighth Chippewa Indian and, though she was not enrolled 
in tribe or recognized as Indian by federal government, she was born on 
reservation and currently lived on one, participated in Indian religious 
ceremonies, had on several occasions been treated at Indian hospitals, and 
had previously been arrested by tribal authorities. i 8 U.S.C.A. § 1152. 
18 Cases that cite this headnote 
8 Indians {= Appeal 
Trial court's erroneous failure to submit question of defendant's Indian status 
to jury, in prosecution for assault on Indian child, was not harmless; 
government was relieved of burden of proving what would have been element 
of offense if defendant had been prosecuted as Indian rather than as non-
Indian, and her conviction as non-Indian had possibly adverse future 
consequences outside criminal context. 18 U .S.CA §§ 1152, 1153. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
9 Criminal Law Prejudice to Defendant in General 
Test for harmless error is not whether jury would have reached same verdict 
in absence of error, but whether error had substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining jury's verdict. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*1217 John Rhodes and Anthony R. Gallagher, Federal Public Defender's Office, 
Missoula, MT, Michael Donahoe, Federal Defenders of Montana, Helena, MT, for the 
defendant-appellant. 
Marcia Hurd, William W. Mercer and Klaus P. Richter, United States Attorney's Office, 
Billings, MT, for the plaintiff-appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Sam E. Haddon, 
District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-02-00089-SEH. 
Before: O'SCANNLAIN, RYMER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges. 
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Opinion 
BYBEE, Circuit Judge. 
Violet Bruce appeals her conviction for simple assault on an Indian child less than 16 
years of age on a reservation in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 113(a)(5). In her 
sole claim of error, Bruce asserts that the case against her was brought under the 
wrong statute. The government charged Bruce under § 1152, which covers offenses 
committed in Indian country, but excepts crimes committed by an Indian against another 
Indian. Bruce contends that she is an Indian. and the government should have charged 
her under 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which covers certain offenses committed by an Indian in 
Indian country. The district court denied her motion to dismiss on this ground. We 
conclude that Bruce presented sufficient evidence that, if believed, established her 
Indian status. We further hold that the court's error was not harmless. We therefore 
reverse. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
In March 2002, Bruce, a resident of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation in northeast 
Montana. choked her five-year-old son, Cylus, and in so doing, bruised his face and 
neck. On September 23, 2002, a grand jury indicted Bruce for assault on a child less 
than 16 years of age on an Indian reservation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 113 
(a)(5). The indictment stated, "That on or about March 25, 2002, at or near Wolf Point, in 
the State and District of Montana, and within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Peck 
Indian Reservation, being Indian country, the defendant, VIOLET BRUCE, did assault 
another, an Indian person who had not attained the age of 16 years .. ., all in violation of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 113(a)(5)." The indictment, thus, alleged that the victim was an 
Indian person, but said nothing about Bruce's status. 
Bruce admitted that she choked Cylus but, on her attorney's advice, she pied not guilty. 
During the district court proceedings, Bruce repeatedly argued that she was Indian. 
Before trial, she moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it should have been 
brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which applies to certain crimes by Indians, rather than 
§ 1152, which excepts crimes by Indians against Indians. The court denied the motion. 
At trial, Bruce's only defense was her claim of Indian status. At the close of the 
government's case, Bruce again raised the argument in a motion for judgment of 
acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, which the district court also denied. At the close of all 
of the evidence, the court considered her Indian status defense at length. Bruce 
introduced evidence that she is one-eighth Chippewa: that her mother is an *1218 
enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Tribe of Oklahoma; that she was born on an 
Indian Reservation: that she currently lives on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation: that 
two of her children are enrolled members of an Indian tribe; that she has been treated 
by Poplar Indian Health Services and the Spotted Bull Treatment Center; that whenever 
she was arrested it "had to have been [by] a tribal person"; and that she has been 
arrested by tribal authorities "all her life." The district court concluded that, under§ 1152, 
Bruce's Indian status was an affirmative defense on which Bruce had the burden of 
production and that she had not borne this burden. Accordingly, the court declined to 
submit the issue to the jury. 
A jury convicted Bruce of violating § 1152 and the district court sentenced her to three 
years' probation. Following her conviction, Bruce unsuccessfully moved to arrest the 
judgment under Fed .R.Crim.P. 34 on the basis of her claimed Indian status. In support 
of her motion, Bruce introduced additional evidence showing that in 1991 she was 
treated as an Indian child by the Fort Peck Tribal Court, exercising jurisdiction pursuant 
to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2004). After her motion was denied, 
Bruce took this appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
2 We review de novo the district court's determination of Indian status under 
18 U.S.C. § 1152 because it is a mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Eric 
B., 86 F.3d 869, 877 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th 
Cir.1996) (reviewing Indian status de novo ). Mixed questions of law and fact are those 
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in which "the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of !aw is undisputed, 
and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard," Pu/Iman-Standard v. 
Swint 456 U.S. 273, 289 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 I_.Ed.2d 66 (1982). 
DISCUSSION 
A. Federal Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country 
The exercise of criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country is a "complex 
patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law," which is better explained by history than by 
logic. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n. 1, 11 OS.Ct. 2053. 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990). 
The historical background of federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country can be traced 
to colonial times, when Indian territory was entirely the province of the tribes and the 
tribes were understood to possess jurisdiction over all persons and subjects present on 
Indian lands. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 
133 (2004 ). This policy continued until shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, 
when Congress extended federal jurisdiction to non-Indians committing crimes against 
Indians in Indian territory.1 Stat. 138 (1790); 1 Stat. 743 (1799); 2 Stat. 139 (1802). 
Congress further extended criminal jurisdiction in 1817 to cover crimes committed by 
Indians and non-Indians in Indian Country; notably, Congress excepted intra-Indian 
offenses, or crimes in which both the victim and perpetrator were Indian. 3 Stat. 383 
(1817), 
The 1817 Act served as the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 1152, which is sometimes 
called the Indian General Crimes Act ("IGCA"). Section 1152 makes federal enclave 
criminal law-a concrete body of law governing areas within the sole and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States-generally applicable to crimes committed in "Indian 
country," See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (defining "Indian country"). Section 1152 provides in full: 
*1219 Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general iaws of the United 
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall 
extend to the Indian country. 
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person 
or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian 
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by 
treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured 
to the Indian tribes respectively. 
In its original form, the IGCA ensured that federal criminal laws reached non-Indians 
committing crimes in Indian country, while at the same time preserving the right of the 
tribes to punish their own. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 201, 
98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978). 
The IGCA excepts from federal criminal jurisdiction three categories of offenses that 
might otherwise be thought to be within the jurisdiction of the tribes: "offenses committed 
by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian," offenses committed by 
an Indian who has been punished by the tribe, and cases secured by treaty to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of a tribe. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Although the "plain language" of§ 
1152 covers crimes in Indian country committed by non-Indians against non-Indians, 
Mui! v. United States, 402 F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir.1968), the Supreme Court has held 
that states retain exclusive jurisdiction over general crimes committed by non-Indians 
against non-Indians in Indian country. Organized Viii. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 68, 
82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 66 
S.Ct. 307. 90 L.Ed. 261 (1946); Draper v. United States. 164 U.S. 240, 17 S.Ct. 107, 41 
L.Ed. 419 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 26 L.Ed. 869 (1881). Thus, 
under the IGCA, the criminal laws of the United States apply to offenses committed in 
Indian country by non-Indians against Indians and by Indians against non-Indians; 
"[section] 1152 establishes federal jurisdiction over interracial crimes only." United 
States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 97 4 (10th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (en bane). 
The exception in the IGCA preserves the right of tribal courts to try ofienses committed 
in Indian country by Indians against Indians, while recognizing that Indian tribes 
generally do not have jurisdiction over non-Indians. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195-206 
OU034S 
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& n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 1011: see also 25 U.S.C_ § 1302(2)(recognizing "the inherent power of 
Indian tribes ... to exercise criminal jurisdiciion over all Indians"). The Supreme Court 
has interpreted the exception as manifesting a broad congressional respect for tribal 
sovereignty in matters affecting only Indians. See United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602. 
36 S.Ct. 699, 60 L.Ed. 1196 (1916) {broadly interpreting the intra-Indian offense 
exception to extend to adultery involving an Indian participant). 
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S.Ct. 
396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883), which held that neither federal nor tribal courts had 
jurisdiction to try an Indian for the murder of another Indian· on a reservation, Congress 
revisited this policy. Congressional displeasure with the Crow Dog decision led to the 
passage of a second statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, designed to establish as federal crimes, 
fourteen named offenses committed by Indians in Indian country. See United Sia/es v. 
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, '1220444 U.S. 859, 100 
S.CL '123, 62 L.Ed.2d 80 (1979). As relevant for our purposes,§ 1153 provides: 
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another 
Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely ... an 
assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years ... 
shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons 
committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the United States. 
18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2004), Enacted in 1885, the Indian Major Crimes Act ("IMCA") 
guaranteed that Indians committing major crimes against other Indians would be treated 
with the same rigor as non-Indian offenders. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203 & n. 4, 98 
S.Ct. 1011. The IMCA, the Court has recognized, is a " 'carefully limited intrusion of 
federal power into the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to punish 
Indians for crimes committed on Indian land.'" United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 
642-43 n. 1, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (quoting Keeble v. United States. 
412 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973)). 1 Assault against an 
individual who has not attained the age of 16 years is one of the enumerated crimes that 
the IMCA covers. 
We have recognized that the "limited intrusion'' on Indian sovereignty in the IMCA is 
itself confined to federal enclave law. In United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 498(9th 
Cir.1994), we rejected the claim "that Indians may not be charged for any criminal 
conduct beyond those crimes enumerated in [the Indian Major Crimes Act]." We 
concluded that the !MCA only concerns "the application of federal enclave law to Indians 
and has no bearing on federal laws of nationwide applicability that make actions criminal 
wherever committed." Id. (citing United Stales v. Top Sky. 547 F.2d 433, 434(9th 
Cir.1976)). Thus, we held that federal criminal laws of general, nationwide applicability-
such as the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S,C, § 371-apply to Indians unless a treaty 
specifically exempts them. Id. at 499(citing United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114, 117 
(9th Cir.1975)). 
Despite these intrusions, tribal courts retain jurisdiction to punish certain crimes 
occurring in Indian country. However, under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 
1301 et al. ("ICRA"), tribal courts may not impose punishment greater than a year's 
imprisonment or a $5,000 fine, or both. Id. § 1302(7). Tribal courts may generally punish 
offenses committed by members of the tribe and may prosecute misdemeanors against 
Indians who are not members of that tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2); see also United States 
v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 124 S.Ct. 1628, 1636, 1639. i 58 L.Ed.2d 420 (2004) (rejecting a 
challenge to the ICRA Amendment and upholding the authority of Congress to "permit 
tribes, as an exercise of their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute non-member 
Indians," but declining to reach the question of "whether the Constitution's Due Process 
or Equal Protection Clauses prohibit tribes from prosecuting a non-member citizen of 
the United States."). Because the tribe's jurisdiction stems from its inherent authority, 
rather than federal delegation, successive prosecution by a *1221 tribe and the federal 
government does not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause, as the two are dual 
sovereigns. Id at 1639. Nonetheless, Congress has statutorily forbidden a successive 
prosecution in federal court brought pursuant to § 1152 after the tribe has imposed 
punishment for the offense. 18 U .S.C. § 1152. 
UU03:SC 
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in addition to federal and tribal jurisdiction, there are statutes in which Congress has 
"unambiguously confer[red] jurisdiction on the State over major offenses committed by 
or against Indians on Indian reservations." Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, ·110, 113 
S.Ct. 1119, 122 L.Ed.2d 457 (1993) (construing The Kansas Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3243), 
Aside from statutory grants, the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in McBratney, 
104 U.S. at 624, is to recognize state jurisdiction for crimes committed by non-Indians 
against non-Indians on Indian territory, 
We can summarize these rules concerning criminal jurisdiction in Indian country as 
follows: 
1. Crimes in which both the perpetrator and victim are Indian are subject to (a) federal 
jurisdiction under§ 1153 if the crime charged is one of the fourteen enumerated 
crimes (and conviction may extend to lesser included offenses), or if the federal 
statute is one of general applicability; (b) state jurisdiction where authorized by 
Congress; and (c) tribal jurisdiction, perhaps running concurrent with either federal or 
state jurisdiction, although punishment is limited to no more than one year and 
$5,000. 
2. Crimes in which the perpetrator, but not the victim, is Indian are subject to (a) 
federal jurisdiction under§ 1152(except where the tribe has already imposed 
punishment or the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction through treaty), or§ 1153(if the 
crime is one of the fourteen enumerated crimes, with conviction perhaps extending to 
lesser included offenses), and pursuant to federal criminal laws of general 
applicability; (b) state jurisdiction where authorized by Congress; and (c) tribal 
jurisdiction, perhaps running concurrently with either federal or state jurisdiction, 
although punishment is limited to no more than one year and $5,000. 2 
3. Crimes in which the victim, but not the perpetrator, is Indian are subject to (a) 
federal jurisdiction under§ 1152, as well as pursuant to federal criminal laws of 
general applicability, and (b) state jurisdiction where authorized by Congress. 
4. Crimes in which both the perpetrator and victim are non-Indian are subject to 
state jurisdiction or federal criminal laws of general applicability.:, 
See United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1231 n. 11 (9th Cir.1980); JULIE 
WREND & CLAY SMITH, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 99-100 (1998). 
We note that the complex scheme established by Congress creates obvious gaps in 
federal jurisdiction to punish crimes in Indian country. For example, a non-Indian may be 
charged under§ 1152 when the victim is an Indian; if his victim is a non- *1222 Indian, 
he generally must be charged under state law. An Indian may be charged with a host of 
federal crimes under§ 1152 if his victim is a non-Indian, but generally only with major 
crimes under§ 1153 if his victim is an Indian. See Antelope. 430 U.S. at 646-47. 97 
S.Ct : 395(rejecting an Equal Protection challenge to§ 1153). 
The one point that emerges with clarity from this otherwise bewildering maze of rules is 
that the question of who is an Indian bears significant legal consequences. Importantly, 
from a defendant's perspective, unless state jurisdiction is specifically authorized by 
Congress, or he is charged pursuant to a generally applicable federal criminal statute, 
an Indian person charged with committing a crime against another Indian person that is 
not listed in § 1153 is subject only to the jurisdiction of the tribe: the offender may only 
be punished for up to one year or fined $5,000, or both. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7), Once an 
Indian person is punished by a tribe for an offense covered by§ 1152, federal courts 
may no longer impose any punishment for that offense. Thus, Indian status carries 
certain benefits in the context of federal criminal adjudications. 
Indian status also bears significance independent of criminal jurisdiction. The host of 
federal statutes and service programs designed to benefit Indians are rife with status-
based classifications used to designate the special position of a formerly sovereign 
people. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646, 97 S.Ct. 1395; FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 19(1982 ed.). These include, to name a few, the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301; the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, id. § 1601; the 
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!nd!an Education Act, jd. § 1001; the Indian Alcohol Substance Abuse Act id. § 2403(3); 
and the Indian Child Welfare Act, id. § 1901. See Morton v. Mancari. 417 U.S. 535, 552, 
94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) ("Literally every piece of legislation dealing with 
Indian tribes and reservations ... single[s] out for special treatment a constituency of 
tribal Indians living on or near reservations."), Accordingly, some commentators have 
even gone so far as to characterize Indian status as a "property interest." See GAIL K. 
SHEFFIELD, THE ARBITRARY INDIAN: THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT OF 
1990, at 138 (1997). Although the requirements may vary depending upon the purpose 
for which Indian status is claimed, courts cannot be ignorant of the collateral 
consequences their rulings might have in future proceedings. It is against the backdrop 
of these formal and functional considerations that we must discern the precise 
relationship between §§ 1152 and 1153-the two bifurcated statutory remnants of a 
complicated jurisdictional history. 
B. Indian Status·as a Defense to§ 1152 
Bruce contends that, because she and her victim are both Indians, her indictment 
should have been brought pursuant to § 1153, rather than § 1152. In order to resolve 
this contention, we must first determine what effect one's claimed Indian status has in a 
prosecution brought pursuant to § 1152. 
3 In United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir.1983), we held that "the 
Government need not allege the non-Indian status of the defendant in an indictment 
under section 1152, nor does it have the burden of going forward on that issue." id. at 
1043. Rather, ''[o]nce the defendant properly raises the issue of his Indian status, then 
the ultimate burden of proof remains ... upon the Government." id. (citing United States 
v. Guess. 629 F.2d 573, 577 n. 4 (9th Cir.1980)). Section 1152 thus requires that Bruce 
not only raise her Indian status but also that she carry the burden of production for that 
issue: Indian '1223 status, after Hester, is in the nature of an affirmative defense. To 
satisfy her burden, Bruce must come forward with enough evidence of her Indian status 
to permit a fact-finder to decide the issue in her favor. No court has yet specified the 
quantum of evidence that must be offered in order to satisfy this production burden. 
Nonetheless, once she meets this burden, the government retains the ultimate burden 
of persuasion-or "the obligation to persuade the trier of fact of the truth of [the] 
proposition," Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep'f' of Labor v. Greenwich 
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 268, 114 S.Ct. 2251, 129 l.Ed.2d 221 (1994)-that the 
exception she claims is inapplicable. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 237, 107 S.Ct. 
1098, 94 l.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that "when an affirmative 
defense does negate an element of the crime ... the state [must] prove the nonexistence 
of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt") (emphasis in original) (citing In re WinsNp, 
397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 
197. 207-09 & nn. 10-11. 97 S.Ct. 2319. 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) (noting that "the trend 
over the years appears to have been to require the prosecution to disprove affirmative 
defenses beyond a reasonable doubt"); Guess, 629 F.2d at 577 n. 4 (explaining the 
general rule that "once a criminal defendant satisfies his burden of production with 
respect to an affirmative defense, the prosecution must prove the inapplicability of this 
defense beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
Bruce argues that the district court erred by refusing to submit the issue of her Indian 
statu_s to the jury because she presented enough evidence to meet her burden of 
production. The government responds that Bruce did not meet her burden, or 
alternately, that, assuming Bruce is Indian, the prosecution under§ 1152 was harmless 
because her conduct was equally illegal under§ 1153. 
C. Determining Who Is an "Indian" 
4 5 The term "Indian" is not statutorily defined, but courts have "judicially 
explicated" its me·aning. Broncheau. 597 F.2d al 1263. The generally accepted test for 
Indian status considers" '(1) the degree of Indian blood; and (2) tribal or government 
recognition as an Indian.'" United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758,761 (9th Cir.1996) 
(quoting Bronc/?eau, 597 F.2d at 1263); see also United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 
How.) 567,573, 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1846) (interpreting the meaning of"lndian" under the 
Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, the precursor of the Major Crimes Act, not to apply 
to a white man who had been adopted into the Cherokee tribe). A person claiming 
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Indian status must satisfy both prongs. The first prong requires ancestr; living in 
America before the Europeans arrived, but this fact is obviously rarely provable as such. 
See CANBY, supra, at 9. Because the general requirement is only of "some" blood, 
evidence of a parent, grandparent. or great-grandparent who is clearly identified as an 
Indian is generally sufficient to satisfy this prong. Id.; see also Vezina v. United States, 
245 F. 411 (8th Cir.1917) (women 1/4 to 3/8 Chippewa Indian held to be Indian); Sully v. 
Uniteci States, 195 F. 113 (8th Cir.1912) (118 Indian blood held sufficient to be Indian); 
St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1460 (D.S.D.1988) (15/32 of Yankton 
Sioux blood sufficient *1224 to satisfy the first requirement of having a degree of Indian 
blood); Goforth v. State. 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okia.Crirr.App.1982) (requirement of 
Indian blood satisfied by testimony that person was slightly less than one-quarter 
Cherokee Indian); Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 73 Wash.2d 677 440 P.2d 
442 (1968) (114 Makah blood sufficient to satisfy Indian blood requirement). 
6 The second prong of the test-tribal orfederal government recognition as an Indian 
-"probes whether the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link to a formerly 
sovereign peopie." St. Ctoud. 702 F.Supp. at 1461. When analyzing this prong, courts 
have considered, in declining order of importance, evidence of the following: "1) tribal 
enrollment; 2) government recognition formally and informally through receipt of 
assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) enjoyment of the benefits of tribal affiliation; and 
4) social recognition as an Indian through residence on a reservation and participation in 
Indian social life." United States v. Lawrence. 51 F.3d 150. 152 (8th Cir.1995) (citing St. 
Cloud, 702 F.Supp. at 1461 ). 
Bruce presented evidence to establish both her Indian blood and recognition. With 
respect to Indian blood, she offered evidence that she is one-eighth Chippewa Indian 
and introduced a certificate of Indian blood confirming this fact. She also offered 
evidence that her mother is an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Tribe of 
Oklahoma, and that two of Bruce's children are enrolled members of an Indian tribe.,; 
With respect to recognition, she presented evidence that she was born on an Indian 
reservation and currently lives on one; that she participates in Indian religious 
ceremonies; that she has, on several occasions, been treated at Indian hospitals; and 
that she was "arrested tribal" all her life. 
7 The district court, applying the two-part test for determining Indian status, 
concluded that Bruce had provided evidence to establish the first prong, her Indian 
blood. Her status, therefore, turned on whether a tribe or the federal government had 
recognized her as an Indian. The district court cited the fact that she was not enrolled in 
a tribe and failed to present evidence that the federal government had recognized her to 
be an Indian. On the basis of this evidence, it found that Bruce had not met her burden 
on this prong and concluded that she had not satisfied her burden of production as to 
the affirmative defense. 
We disagree. Tribal enrollment is "the common evidentiary means of establishing Indian 
status, but it is not the only means nor is it necessarily determinative." Broncheau, 597 
F.2d at 1263; accord Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 1395 ("[E]nrollment in an 
official tribe has not been held to be an absolute requirement for federal jurisdiction .... ") 
(citations omitted); Keys, 103 F.3d at 761 ("While tribal enrollment is one means of 
establishing status as an 'Indian' under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. it is not the sole means of 
proving such status.") (citation omitted); Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir.1938) 
("The lack of enrollment ... is not determinative of status .... [T]he refusal of the 
Department of Interior to enroll a certain Indian as a member of a certain tribe is not 
necessarily an administrative determination that the person is not an Indian."); St. 
Cloud, 702 F.SL1pp. at 1461 ("[A] person may still be an Indian though not enrolled with 
a recognized tribe."), Nor have we required evidence of federal recognition. Rather, we 
have emphasized that there '1225 must be some evidence of government or tribal 
recognition. See Keys, 103 F.3d at 761 (concluding that where child was shown to have 
Indian blood and was treated by tribe as a member of the tribe, district court properly 
found that she was an Indian); accord Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d at 31; Lewis v. State. 137 
Idaho 882, 55 P.3d 875, 878 (Ct.App.2001 ), This stems. from the recognition that one of 
an Indian tribe's most basic powers is the authority to determine questions of its own 
membership. See Santa Clan:.-1 Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 
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56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); United es v. Wheeler, 435 U S. 313. 322 n. 1 s. 98 S.Ct. 
1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978); Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76, 27 S.Ct. 29, 
51 L.Ed. 96 (1906); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 18 S.Ct. 60, 42 L.Ed. 442 (1897). 
Motivated in part by equal protection concerns, the dissent proposes a new test for 
determining Indian status; one that would conflate our two-pronged Rogers inquiry and 
multifaceted "recognition" guidelines into a single question: whether the individual is 
enrolled or eligible for enrollment in a federally recognized tribe. From a purely 
conceptual standpoint, we agree that eligibility for enrollment provides a simpler 
framework within which we might judge Indian status as a political affiliation with a 
formerly sovereign people. Nonetheless, it is not the test that we have adopted. and 
until either Congress acts or the Supreme Court or an en bane panel of our court 
revises the "recognition" prong of the Rogers test. _we are bound by our prior 
jurisprudence. In particular, we are bound by the body of case law which holds that 
enrollment, and, indeed, even eligibility therefor, is not dispositive of Indian status. 
Broncheau_. 597 F .2d at 1263; Keys, 103 F.3d at 761. In sum, we are not permitted to 
hold that these cases do not mean what they say. c 
Consequently, we find United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, particularly instructive. 
Keys, a non-Indian, was charged under§ 1152 with assault of his daughter. who 
possessed one-fourth Indian blood. Keys argued that the government had failed to 
prove that his daughter, who was not enrolled. was an Indian (presumably on the theory 
that after McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624, assault committed by a non-Indian against a non-
Indian victim could be charged under state law, but not under§ 1152). The magistrate 
found that the tribal court had exercised jurisdiction over Keys's daughter. and that she 
had been provided medical services by an Indian hospital. The magistrate concluded 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" that, under such *1226 circumstances. she was a "de facto 
member" of the tribe. Id. at 760. Without considering whether she was eligible for 
enrollment, we concluded t_hat her Indian status was "amply demonstrated." Id. at 761 .7 
Because of the procedural posture of the case with which we are presented, we are not 
required to decide whether Bruce conclusively established that she was an Indian. 
Rather, we must merely determine whether she brought forward enough evidence of 
tribal recognition to permit her defense to be heard by the jury. We conclude that she 
did. 
Bruce produced evidence that she had participated in sacred tribal rituals, including at 
least one sweat lodge ritual; that she was born on an Indian Reservation and continues 
to reside on one; that two of her children are enrolled members of an Indian tribe; and 
that she has been treated by Poplar Indian Health Services and the Spotted Bull 
Treatment Center. More significantly, her mother testified that whenever she was 
arrested it ''had to have been [by] a tribal person" and that she h_as been arrested by 
tribal authorities "all her life." The precise testimony was as follows: 
0. When Violet was young, did she have issues or problems with the tribal 
authorities? 
A. Not really. But she was arrested tribal all her life. 
Q. Well, that's what I want to talk about. What does that mean that she was "arrested 
tribal"? 
A. She got out of hand and someone had to come and get her. arrest her. And it had 
to have been a tribal person. 
Q. And that would be drinking behavior and such? 
A. Yeah. Fighting with her sister. 
Q. Now, the tribal authorities would step in and take charge of the situation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did that involve dealing with the tribal authorities? 
A. Yes. 
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0. And was Violet treated as an Indian person during those times? 
A. Yes. 
0. By the tribe? 
A. Yes.e 
*1227This testimony is significant because, as we have discussed, the tribe has no 
jurisdiction to punish anyone but an Indian. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7); Oliphant. 435 U.S. at 
191, 98 S.Ct. 1011. 
In sum, Bruce brought forward testimony to establish that she was "arrested tribal" her 
entire life and that whenever she had a brush with the law it had to be with tribal 
authorities. Although not introduced as artfully by her counsel as it could have been, 
Bruce has put the question of tribal criminal jurisdiction on the table, and, in so doing, 
raised strong evidence of tribal recognition. The assumption and exercise of a tribe's 
criminal jurisdiction, while not conclusive evidence of Indian status, significantly bolsters 
the argument that Bruce met her burden of producing sufficient evidence upon which a 
jury might rationally conclude that she was an Indian. 
We caution that Bruce was only required to meet a production burden. When combined 
with the testimony as to her one-eighth Chippewa blood line, the cumulative effect of the 
additional evidence of tribal recognition does at least that. To decline to find sufficient 
evidence of Indian status on these facts is to shift the burden to the defense. Bruce's 
burden is one of mere production. 
Accordingly, we hold that Bruce brought forward sufficient evidence that, if believed, 
would permit a jury rationally to conclude that Bruce was Indian. 8 
D. Harmless Error 
8 Having determined that the court erred in declining to submit the issue of Bruce's 
Indian status to the jury, we must now determine whether that error was harmless. See 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) ("Any error ... that does not affect substantial rights must be 
disregarded."). The government argues that it makes no difference whether a jury could 
have concluded that Bruce was Indian because that would only mean that her conduct 
violated § 1153, rather than § 1152. Effectively, the government argues that because 
her victim was an Indian, her crime must be chargeable under either§ 1152 or§ 1153, 
and Bruce's Indian status is therefore irrelevant. Although the government's argument 
finds some support in the cases examining this issue, we find these cases 
distinguishable and the argument unpersuasive. 
In Henry v. United States, 432 F.2d 114 (9th Cir.1970), modified, 434 F.2d 1283 (9th 
Cir.1971 ), we concluded that when an indictment charged a violation of§ 1152 but the 
government actually prosecuted the case under§ 1153, the error was harmless. In 
Henry, the indictment listed § 1152 but alleged that the defendant was Indian. See 
Henry. 432 F .2d at 117-18. The court instructed the jury that the defendant's Indian 
status was an element of the offense, and the jury found that the government had 
proven that the defendant was Indian beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Although the 
indictment read§ 1152. the defendant was in all other respects prosecuted under§ 
1153, and not § 1152. Thus, Henry dealt with little more than a scrivener's error. 
In United States v. Heat/1. 509 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 197 4 ), we concluded that an indictment 
under§ 1153, alleging that both the victim and the defendant were Indian, was *1228 
sufficient to support a conviction under§ 1152. The facts in Heath were quite unusual. 
Heath had initially stipulated that she was an Indian (which would have subjected her to 
§ 1153); however, on appeal she argued that, by act of Congress, the Klamath tribe was 
dissolved, and she was no longer entitled to claim Indian status at the time of her 
offense. See 25 U.S.C. § 564q (2004). We agreed that she was no longer an Indian, but 
held that the error in the indictment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 20. 
In reaching this conclusion, considerable emphasis was placed on Heath's pre-trial 
stipulation that she was an Indian, id. at 20 n. 4, as well as the indictment's proper 
reference to the victim's Indian status, which, given the termination of Heath's Indian 
status, was a pre-requisite for her conviction under§ 1152. Id. at 20. Moreover, as 
Or1n,,..._, ... ,_,, uUJ:J;: 
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Heath clearly implies, a denial o ndian status operates as a jurisdictional clement 
under§ 1153, which is generally resolved by a judge, rather than an affirmative 
defense, which must be submitted to the jury after the defendant carries his production 
burden. 10 Importantly, however, in neither Henry nor Heath was the question of Indian 
status contested at trial. 
While other circuits have reached the same conclusion under similar circumstances, 
only one case involved an objection timely filed. In United States v. Wt7ite Horse, 316 
F.3d 769 (8th Cir.2003), the Eighth Circuit held that a charge brought under§ 1152 
rather than§ 1153 was not plainly erroneous because "[b]etween them, the statutes 
apply to all defendants whatever their race or ethnicity." id. at 772-73; see also id. at 
772 (noting that objection was not raised at trial), The Tenth Circuit in Prentiss, 256 F.3d 
971, concluded that, although the Indian/non-Indian status of the victim and defendant 
are.essential elements of§ 1152 crimes which must be alleged in the indictment, the 
failure of the indictment to allege those elements was harmless error. See a/so id. at 
983 (reasoning that the indictment should be construed liberally because the 
defendant's challenge was belated). In United States v. John, 587 F.2d 683, 688 (5th 
Cir.1979), the Fifth Circuit, without commenting on the timeliness of the motion, 
concluded that an indictment's erroneous reliance on § 1153, rather than § 1152, was 
harmless where the applicable federal enclave law was also referenced such that it was 
"clear that the indictment asserted jurisdiction under§ 1152 as an unstated premise." 
Close examination demonstrates that none of these cases involves a timely challenge to 
a prosecution both instituted and actually conducted pursuant to the wrong statute. Yet, 
their reasoning is alluring because Bruce-who does not dispute that she committed the 
underlying act of choking her child-is guilty under either§ 1152 or § 1153; either she is 
an Indian or she is not. See White Horse, 316 F.3d at 773, Given all of the evidence 
offered at trial, the conclusion that the district court reached the "correct result" despite 
its error seems almost inescapable. See, e.g., United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 
915, 920 (2d Cir.1945) (Frank, J., dissenting) (famously characterizing this approach to 
harmless error review as follows: "If we, sitting on a reviewing court, believe, from 
merely reading the record, that a defendant is guilty, then we ... hold that an error ... 
even if it may seriously have *1229 prejudiced the jury against the defendant, is to be 
regarded as 'harmless.'"). 
9 Nonetheless, this logic belies harmless error scrutiny. In reviewing 
nonconstitutional error on direct appeal under Rule 52(a), we adhere to the analysis first 
provided by the Supreme Court in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 
1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); see a/so Brechtv. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 
S,Ct, 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (reaffirming the Kotteakos standard); United States 
v. Brooke. 4 F.3d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that the standard for 
nonconstitutional error on direct review is governed by Kotteakos ). In rejecting the 
premise underlying the "correct result" approach-namely, that a defendant has not been 
harmed by error if he should have been convicted in any event-Kotteakos reaffirmed a 
touchstone principle of appellate review: "[l]t is not the appellate court's function to 
determine guilt or innocence. Nor is it to speculate upon probable reconviction and 
decide according to how the speculation comes out.... Those judgments are exclusively 
for the jury." Kolleakos, 328 U.S. at 763, 66 S.Ct. 1239 (citations omitted). Instead, 
Kotteakos offered the following standard: 
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the 
judgment should stand .. ,, But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, 
after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action 
from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the 
error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not 
affected, 
Id. at 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239. The Court emphasized that whether "conviction would, or 
might probably, have resulted in properly conducted trial is not the criterion"; rather, we 
are merely to inquire whether "the error had substantia I and injurious effect or influence 
in determining the jwy's verdict." Id. at 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239 (emphasis added), 
OU03'5c' 
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Using this framework, it is clear that our answer to the question of what would have 
happened without the error should not be based on our own satisfaction with the verdict, 
or even whether the evidence was suffici,ent for the jury to have reached the same 
verdict absent the error. The issue, rather, is what the jury actually would have done 
without the error. See WAYNER. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 27.6(b) (2d ed.1999). It is against this backdrop that we 
judge the harm caused to Bruce by the trial court's erroneous decision to prevent Bruce 
from reaching the jury on the question of her Indian status. 
We note that Congress has set forth, in §§ 1152 and 1153, two different mechanisms for 
asserting federal criminal jurisdiction. We have previously concluded that the 
defendant's Indian status is an essential element of a § 1153 offense which the 
government must allege in the indictment and prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
United Stales v. James, 980 F.2d 131_4, 1317-19 (9th Cir.1992) (concluding that where 
the defendant challenges the indictment before trial, the failure to allege Indian status is 
fatal to an indictment under§ 1153); Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 1262 (implying that the 
defendant's Indian status is one of the "necessary elements" to be proven by the 
government ·1n a§ 1153 prosecut'1on). Our conclusion that Bruce met her burden of 
production under§ 1152 implies a finding that the jury could rationally acquit on the 
basis that the government failed to disprove her claimed Indian status. This does not 
equate to a finding that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Bruce is Indian, as required by§ 1153. By prosecuting Bruce under§ 1152, rather than 
§ 1153, the government did not '1230 have to prove that Bruce was an Indian. In so 
doing, the government released itself of its obligation to prove an element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's error was, thus, not anymore harmless than 
a failure to prove that the victim was indeed a child under the age of 16. Absent proof of 
Bruce's Indian status, there is no federal crime under § 1153. 
Moreover, were we to find harmless error in this case-where the defendant has objected 
from the outset that she could not be charged under§ 1152-we would have merged the 
two statutes into one. We would be inviting the government to charge under either 
statute, calculating that one of the provisions is likely to apply. This is not without 
consequences. Because § 1152 requires proof of fewer elements, the government 
would always have an incentive to indict under that section, thereby shifting the costs of 
producing evidence of Indian status to the defendant. 
Furthermore, as we have discussed, Bruce's status as an Indian ve/ non has 
consequences for any future prosecutions, and may also have collateral consequences 
in future non-criminal hearings where Indian status is at issue. To offer a single 
example, prior tribal punishment, as noted previously, is an affirmative defense to a 
prosecution instituted pursuant to § 1152. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (stating that "[t]his 
section shall not extend to ... any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country 
who has been punished by the local law of the tribe ... "). Were we to find harmless error 
in this case, it is not clear on what basis this affirmative defense could ever be raised in 
a prosecution brought against an Indian person under§ 1152, so long as the crime 
could have been charged under§ 1153. In sum, we simply cannot conclude. based 
upon the record, that the district court's error did not have a prejudicial effect on the 
outcome of the proceeding. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S .Ct. 1239. 
We note, however, that this statutory framework creates an obvious and troubling 
conundrum. It is entirely probable that the government may be simultaneously unable 
either to prove or disprove a claim of Indian status, effectively foreclosing conviction 
under either statute. This is especially likely given that the burden of proof required for a 
defendant to place Indian status at issue in a § 1152 case may be as low as a 
preponderance, whereas the burden of proof required for the government to both 
disprove Indian status under§ 1152 and to prove Indian status under§ 1153 is proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. We are also aware of the additional expenditure of 
government resources required to reindict Bruce under a different provision and to retry 
her with the same evidence, but we decline to challenge the government's charging 
decision. See Prentiss, 256 F.3d at 986 n. 14. Judicial correction of indictments that 
erroneously misrepresent a defendant's Indian status presents the possibility of future 
- --o- -- .....,,_ --
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adverse collateral consequences outside the criminal context, and lmpropedy shifts the 
burden of proof otherwise applicable to the parties within the criminal arena. 
In addition, where indictment is required, judicial correction of this sort serves to usurp 
the uniquely protective role of the grand jury. 11 The Fifth Amendment vests the grand 
jury with responsibility *1231 for determining "whether there is probable cause to believe 
a crime has been committed and[for] ... protect[ing] ... citizens against unfounded 
criminal prosecutions." United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338,343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 
L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). The grand jury is part of the prosecutorial process, Batz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478,510, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), and we may not 
direct its activities. See United Stales v. Dionisio, 41 O U.S. 1, 17, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 
L.Ed.2d 67 (1973). Accordingly, we may not presume to correct the decisions of the 
grand jury by altering the sections charged under the United States Code, except 
through our judgments, any more than we can, except through our judgments, correct 
the prosecutorial decisions of the executive. See United S1ates v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 
47-50, 112 S.Ct.1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352(1992); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
693, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 
457, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1868). 
While we are not ignorant of the troublesome nature of our judgment, we remain bound 
by the language and structure of these two statutes. The federal crimes at issue here 
"are solely creatures of statute," Stapies v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,604, 114 S.Ct. 
1793, 128 L.Ed .2d 608 ( 1994 ). Subject to constitutional limitations not implicated here, 
Congress-not a federal appellate court-is authorized to define the elements of a federal 
criminal offense. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684,689 & n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 
L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). It is likewise up to Congress to correct any awkwardness in the 
interrelation of the acts it promulgates. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is 
REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for proceedings 
consistent with this decision. 
RYivlER, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
I part company because until now, no one has ever held that an adult may be an Indian 
(for purposes of legal status, not for purposes of ethnicity) when she is neither enrolled 
as a member of a tribe nor eligible for membership, nor entitled to tribal or government 
benefits to which only Indians are entitled; our law does not require us to allow Bruce to 
put her legal status as an Indian into play-and thus to shift the burden to the government 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she is not an Indian-in the absence of any 
evidence that she is at least eligible for tribal membership or recognition; and it makes 
no sense to do so, for the majority's contrary rule allows Bruce, on the same set of facts, 
to be both an Indian (who cannot be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1152) and not an 
Indian (who cannot be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1153). 
The facts are undisputed. The evidence shows that: 
• Bruce's mother, who is enrolled in the Turtle Mountain Tribe, is Indian 
• Bruce is one-eighth Chippewa 
• Bruce currently lives on the reservation of the Fort Peck Tribe 
• Bruce associates with Indian persons 
• Bruce has three children, two of whom are Indian and are enrolled in a tribe 
• Bruce engaged in one sweat lodge (a ceremony that has religious significance) 
*1232 • Bruce was "arrested tribal all her life" 1 
There is no evidence: 
• that Bruce is an enrolled member of any tribe 
• that Bruce is recognized as a tribe member by any tribe or the federal government 
• that Bruce enjoys any benefits of tribal affiliation 
U,., r, U' .-, .--- .~ U JOc 
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'"that Bruce is eligible for tribai membership 
• that Bruce has voted in tribal elections, that she has held tribal office, that she has 
served on tribal juries, that she has received payments or allotments made only to 
Indians, or that she is employed by a tribal organization. 
I agree with the district court that, as a matter of law, this evidence does not permit a 
jury to find that Bruce has legal status as an Indian. 
The Federal Enclave Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, provides for the prosecution of crimes 
committed in Indian country by non-Indians against Indians, but its coverage does not 
extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another 
Indian;§ 1153, in turn, provides that an Indian who commits certain major crimes 
against the person or property of another Indian may be prosecuted under the general 
laws of the United States. Neither section defines "Indian." However, courts generally 
follow the Rogers test, 2 which considers "(1) the degree of Indian blood; and (2) tribal or 
government recognition as an Indian." United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th 
Cil'.1996). We have held that the defendant's legal status as a non-Indian is not an 
element or an essential jurisdictional fact that must be charged in an indictment under§ 
1152. United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir.1983). Rather, as we 
explained in adopting the burden-shifting framework that controls§ 1152 prosecutions 
and this case, 
[i]t is far more manageable for the defendant to shoulder the burden of producing 
evidence that he is a member of a federally recognized tribe than it is for the 
Government to produce evidence that he is not a member of any one of the hundreds 
of such tribes. We accordingly hold that the Government need not allege the non-
Indian status of the defendant in an indictment under section 1152, nor does it have 
the burden of going forward on that issue. Once the defendant properly raises the 
issue of his Indian status, then the ultimate burden of proof remains, of course, upon 
the Government. 
Id. at 1043 (emphasis added). 
While we have stated in different contexts that enrollment is not the exclusive way to 
show that one is Indian, 3 we have *1233 recognized that tribal membership is the 
common thread and evidentiary means of establishing Indian status. See Broncheau, 
597 F.2d at 1263(observing this, and noting that the defendant admitted he was enrolled 
and never suggested he did not understand the term "Indian" as it applied to him). So 
far as I can tell, no court has ever held that an adult could have Indian legal status who 
was neither enrolled or eligible for enrollment, nor entitled to tribal or government 
benefits due only to Indians. 4 Indeed, enrollment-or at a minimum, ,.1234 eligibility for 
enrollment-may be constitutionally required to avoid equal protection problems because 
otherwise, enforcement of federal criminal laws would arguably be based on an 
impermissible racial classification. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646. 97 S.CL 1395(holding 
that there was no constitutional problem because defendants were not subjected to 
federal criminal jurisdiction under§ 1153 on account of their Indian race, but because 
they are enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe); Kt~ys, 103 F.3d at 761 (noting 
that Antelope had upheld prosecution on equal protection grounds because "the term 
'Indian' describes a political group or membership, not a racial group"), 
It is difficult to fathom what the "recognition" prong of Rogers means if not enrollment or 
eligibility for enrollment in a tribe, or receipt of tribal or federal benefits to which only 
Indians are entitled. Indian ties cannot be enough, because one can have ties without 
legal status. As the Supreme Court observed in Duro v. Reina, "[m]any non-Indians 
reside on reservations, and have close ties to tribes through marriage or long 
employment. Indeed, the population of non-Indians on reservations generally is greater 
than the population of all Indians, ... " 495 U.S. 676,695,110 S.Ct. 2053, 109 L.Ed.2d 
693 (1990). 
But if-as the majority holds-ties are enough for purposes of§ 1152, no reason of logic, 
linguistics, or grammar suggests that ties should not also be enough for purposes of§ 
1153." Yet clearly they are not. To the contrary, we have held for purposes of§ 1153 
that a terminated Klamath Indian is no longer an Indian because she lost her Indian 
0 U O <', ·- C' ' J:J::,:, 
--o- ..... ....., ... .L.,/ 
https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I5e26959479ecl ld99c4dbb2f0352441dNiew/FullTe... 6/7/2011 
legal status upon termination. United $/Atr;s v. Heat/1, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir.197/4); 
Hester. 719 F.2d at 1043 n. 2 (so noting). If that is so, then it makes no sense for an 
Indian who has never had tribal membership and is ineligible for it to have legal status 
as an Indian. A court cannot rationally hold that both things are true. 
United Sia/es v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.1996), which the majority points to as 
"instructive," op. at 1225, is different. There, the question of Indian status arose with 
respect to a two-year old girl who was not enrolied in the Tribe. However, we decided 
that her lack of enrollment did not control the determination of her Indian status because 
she could not have enrolled herself. her mother was an enrolled member of the 
Colorado River Indian Tribe, the girl had one-quarter Colorado River Indian blood, the 
girl's custody was litigated in the Colorado River Indian Tribal Court which exercised 
jurisdiction over her and continued to do so at the time of the *1235 federal action, and 
the allegations that formed the gravamen of the federal prosecution were investigated 
by Colorado River Indian police. Id. at 761. Bruce's situation differs because she is an 
adult who could have enrolled herself (if she were eligible);she has one-eighth 
Chippewa blood (which is not the bloodline of the Ford Peck tribes), and she was not 
under the jurisdiction of any tribal court at the time of the federal action. 
In sum, the district court got the test right, correctly construed the facts in the light most 
favorable to Bruce, and concluded that, as a matter of law, the evidence adduced by 
Bruce does not permit a reasonable inference that she has Indian legal status. Applying 
the Rogers test, the district court acknowledged evidence of some Indian blood 
possessed by Bruce. This evidence shows that she is one-eighth Chippewa, but there is 
no evidence that this meets the quantum of blood requirement for recognition by that 
tribe. As Judge Canby notes in his Nutshell, tribes have different blood requirements for 
enrollment; many require one-fourth tribal blood, and at least one requires five-eighths. 6 
William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshe/110 (4th ed.2003). Regardless, 
there is no evidence that Bruce is enrolled as a member of the Turtle Mountain Tribe-
where her mother is enrolled-or of the Sioux or Assiniboine tribes which are the two 
tribes at Ford Peck, where Bruce now lives, or of any Chippewa tribe. There is no 
evidence that she is eligible for membership. There is no evidence that Bruce holds 
herself out as Indian; although she enrolled two of her three children, she has not 
enrolled (or for all that appears, ever tried to enroll) herself. 
This indicates that she either knows that she cannot be a tribal member, or does not 
wish to identify herself as one. There is no evidence that she has received benefits, 
payments, or allotments to which only an Indian is entitled. Nor is there any evidence 
that Bruce has taken part in tribal affairs by voting, serving on juries, or holding office. 
There is no evidence that Fort Peck has been involved in her life in a significant enough 
way to constitute recognition; and conversely, visiting a sweat lodge with her mother on 
one occasion does not manifest participation in Indian life or heritage to any substantial 
extent. The only evidence of Bruce's legal status as an Indian comes from the fact that 
her mother is an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Tribe, Bruce was "arrested 
tribal," was married for a time to an Indian, has two enrolled children, lives on the Fort 
Peck reservation (which is home to tribes with which she has no blood relationship), and 
socializes with others on the reservation because of her children. This could well be true 
of a lot of people, for many non-Indians live on Indian reservations, where they too get 
in trouble, socialize with Indians, marry Indians, and have children who are recognized 
as Indian. These facts alone do not raise an inference that Bruce has been recognized 
by any tribe or the government. 
Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Bruce failed to produce sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that she has legal status as an Indian. I would not cut a 
new path that allows someone to ''1236 have the legal status of an Indian, and not an 
Indian, on the same set of facts that does not include enrollment, eligibility for 
enrollment, or entitlement to Indian benefits as a common denominator. I therefore 
dissent. 
Parallel Citations 
05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 379, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 505 
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Footnotes 
The scope of the statute was expanded significantly by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Keeble, which held that an Indian charged pursuant to 
the IMCA was entitled to request and receive instructions as to lesser and 
included offenses if the evidence would permit the jury rationally to find him 
guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater. Id. at 208-09; see 
also United Stales v. John., 587 F.2d 683 (5th Cir.1979) (upholding 
conviction on lesser and included offense); accord Felicia v. United States, 
495 F.2d 353 (8th Cir.1974). 
2 Offenses committed by Indians against multiple victims, including both 
Indians and others, would fall subject to competing, and perhaps 
concurrent, claims of federal, state and tribal jurisdiction, although 
presumably a federal court could not impose punishment for an offense 
covered by § 1152 after a tribal court had done so. 
3 Offenses committed by non-Indians against multiple victims, including both 
Indians and others, would fall subject to competing, and perhaps 
concurrent, claims of federal and state court jurisdiction, 
4 The Indian Civil Rights Act does not define "Indian" but begs the question 
by defining an Indian as "any person who would be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under section 1153, title 18, 
[United States Code] if that person were to commit an offense listed in that 
section in Indian country to which that section applies." 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) 
(2004), 
5 The presentence report, perhaps accepting her vouching uncritically, listed 
her race as "American Indian." 
6 We note, in addition, that unenrolled Indians are eligible for a wide range of 
federal benefits directed to persons recognized by the Secretary of Interior 
as Indians without statutory reference to enrollment. For example, The 
Native American Programs Act of 1974, creating the Administration for 
Native Americans, operates under regulations with a very broad definition 
of Indian: "any individual who claims to be an Indian and who is regarded 
as such by the Indian community in which he or she lives or by the Indian 
community of which he or she claims to be a part," 45 C.F.R. § 1336.1 
(1989): see a/so Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976, 25 U.S.C. § 
1603(c)(member of a tribe including those terminated and those recognized 
in the future; descendent in first or second degree of a member: and 
anyone "determined to be an Indian under regulations promulgated by the 
Secretary"); Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 1159(c)(1) 
(1994), 25 U.S.C. § 305e(d)(2) (1994) (defining "Indian" as "any individual 
who is a member of an Indian tribe; or for the purposes of this section is 
certified as an Indian artisan by an Indian tribe") (emphasis added); 
ROBERT N. CLINTON, ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 84 (3d ed. 1991) ("Beginning with the Non-Intercourse Acts of 
the late 1700s and through enactment of the 1934 Indian Reorganization 
Act, federal law has treated 'Indians' as a class without regard to proof of 
tribal enrollment"). 
7 See also United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 787 (8th Cir.1976) 
(concluding that defendant, Manuel M. Alvarado, was an Indian for 
purposes of § 1153, based merely on evidence that he possessed one-
fourth Yurok Indian blood and, at one time, he filed·an application to be 
recognized as a member of the Yurok Tribe on the California State 
Judgment Rolls; the court stated: Alvarado possessed "Indian blood and [] 
held [himself] out to be [an] Indian[]"); St. Cloud, 702 F.Supp. at 1460 
(concluding that because the defendant resided on a reservation, 
benefitted from tribal programs, and was socially recognized as an Indian, 
•· u o· "· ·, "''. U 0:Jl 
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he met the Rogers test for Indian stotus 1 notvv'rthstanding the fact that he 
was no longer enrolled or eligible for enrollment in any federally recognized 
tribe). 
8 While we decline to rest our decision on information contained in the 
presentence investigation report, we note, that the report corroborates her 
mother's testimony by listing two adult convictions in the Fort Peck Tribal 
Court for disorderly conduct. Additionally, a reply brief filed in support of her 
Rule 34 Motion to Arrest the Judgment charged that the government "failed 
[its obligations under Brady v. Maryland] to disclose during the discovery 
process that the defendant had been adjudicated in the Fort Peck Tribal 
Court as an Indian." 373 U.S. 83, 83S.Ct. 7194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 
Indeed, the record reflects that the government's case agent and BIA 
investigator was the Tribal Court judge who adjudicated Bruce as an 
Indian. This very same investigator sat with counsel for the government 
during the entire trial, quietly watching Bruce attempt to bring forward 
evidence of her tribal recognition, without disclosing that the defendant had 
been twice treated as an Indian in an Indian Tribal Court. 
9 Bruce also presented evidence in a post-trial motion for arrest of judgment 
brought pursuant to FED. R. C RIM. P. 34 that she was adjudicated as an 
Indian child by a tribal court exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the Indian 
Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2004). Because we conclude that the 
evidence Bruce introduced at trial was sufficient to meet her burden of 
production, we need not decide whether the additional evidence that Bruce 
presented in her post-trial motions merits consideration. 
, O In addition, we note that harmless error analysis may find greater 
justification when the prosecution has already met the more difficult task of 
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under§ 1153, which requires 
proof of Indian status, rather than choosing to indict under§ 1152, which 
effectively shifts the burden and cost of producing evidence of Indian status 
to the defendant. 
11 While the Fifth Amendment requires presentment or indictment by a grand 
jury in felony cases, assault on a child under the age of sixteen, the crime 
for which Bruce is charged, is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by one 
year's imprisonment and/or a $100,000 fine, and, thus, does not implicate 
this concern. We note, however, that of the remaining 13 crimes 
enumerated in § 1153, at least 1 O require indictment by a grand jury unless 
waiver is obtained. Where indictment is required, the concern for avoiding 
judicial usurpation by retroactively modifying indictments to conform to the 
evidence established at trial is directly implicated. 
In the present case, although Bruce did not have to be indicted by a 
grand jury, the government nonetheless opted to proceed by grand jury 
indictment. While the prosecution's choice to indict-because it was 
merely optional-does not trigger our concern for safeguarding the 
protective role of the grand jury, it does demonstrate that the error in the 
indictment was easily correctable. Once her Indian status was 
established, Bruce could have been recharged by Bill of Information, 
without undue burden on the prosecution. 
This is the only evidence in the record about Bruce's involvement with tribal 
authorities. Bruce (quite properly) does not rely on anything else. While the 
majority disclaims reliance on two arrests reported in the Presentence 
Investigation Report, it nevertheless uses these incidents (both for 
disorderly conduct for which the disposition was "forfeit bail") and an 
argument made in a reply brief to bolster its position. Of course, neither 
was in evidence before the district court when it found that Bruce had not 
met her burden of production on the affirmative defense of her Indian 
status, and should not be considered for any purpose on appeal. Even so, 
these offenses show nothing pertinent because, for all we know, they are 
0 U'1 u· ,", ·, ,-. 
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not even Bruce's and 'vve have no vvay of knowing whe'ther trtba! jurisdiction 
was contested or conceded. 
2 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 4 How. 567, 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1846). 
3 See Keys. 103 F.3d at 761 (stating that lack of enrollment of two-year old 
who had been treated as member of the tribe by the tribe and her parents 
does not control determination of her Indian status); United States v. 
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.1979) (upholding § 1153 
indictment that charged defendant as an Indian against challenge that it 
was deficient for failing also to charge that he was enrolled as enrollment is 
not an "absolute requirement." nor necessarily determinative, when the 
indictment adequately put the defendant on notice of his classification as 
an Indian); Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A 
Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L.Rev. 503, 516 (1976). 
The Eighth Circuit, which considers the determination of Indian or non-
Indian status a conclusion of law, has broken the test into four factors 
which are, in declining order of importance: "1) tribal enrollment; 2) 
government recognition formally and informally through receipt of 
assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) enjoyment of the benefits of tribal 
affiliation; and 4) social recognition as an Indian through residence on a 
reservation and participation in Indian social life.'' United Stales v. 
Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150,152 (8th Cir.1995); see also United States v. 
Torres, 733 F.2d 449,456 (7th Cir.1984) (approving consideration of 
whether a person is recognized as an Indian by an Indian tribe, or by the 
federal government, and whether a person resides on an Indian reservation 
and holds himself out as an Indian). 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 
L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (noting that because§ 1153 does not apply to many 
individuals who are racially to be classified as Indians, the government 
offered proof that the defendants are enrolled members of the Coeur 
d'Alene Tribe and thus not emancipated from tribal relations; declining to 
reach question whether nonenrolled Indians may ever be subject to § 
1153); Lawrence. 51 F.3d at 152-54 (holding that alleged victim was non-
Indian given that she was not an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. 
or any other tribe and wasn't eligible for enrollment because she had not 
completed the requirements for tribal enrollment; the medical services she 
had received from the Indian Health Service were not in her own right; the 
fact that the Oglala Sioux Tribe had taken custody and placed the victim 
under the care of her grandmother (an enrolled member) was too 
insignificant an involvement to show tribal recognition as the victim was not 
enrolled or eligible for enrollment; and she did not attend pow-wows, Indian 
dances or other Indian cultural events and lived off-reservation except for a 
brief period before she was abused); United States v. James, 980 F.2d 
1314, 1319 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that facts conclusively proved that the 
defendant and victim were enrolled Indians within the meaning of§ 1153): 
United Sti:l/e.s v. Dodge. 538 F.2d 770, 786-87 (8th Cir.1976) (holding that 
evidence of having filed an application for enrollment in the Yurok Tribe 
and previous entry on the Pawnee tribal roll, and the fact that defendants 
had held themselves out to be Indians within the meaning of§ 1153, 
established Indian status under§ 1153); United States v. Heath. 509 F.2d 
16, 19 (9th Cir.1974) (refusing to uphold federal jurisdiction over an 
individual who was anthropologically a Klamath Indian after the Termination 
Act ended his tribal affiliation); United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 953 
(9th Cir.1974) (stating, in dicta, that enrollment or lack of it is not 
determinative of status as an Indian; the defendant had asked that his . 
name be removed from the rolls of the Colville Tribe but it was not done); 
Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30-32 (7th Cir.1938) (holding on habeas review 
of a state court conviction that petitioner was Indian even though the 
enrolling agent for the Bad River Reservation had refused to enroll him 
because he belonged to the Lost Band of St. Croix Chippewas-an action 
- --o- ....................... .,,, 
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which dldn1t show that the petitioner was not Indian but rather, was 
evidence that he was-and noting that he was the child of a full-blooded 
Indian of the St. Croix Band of Lake Superior Chippewas and a father who 
was a half-blood, had always resided on a reservation that was set aside 
by treaty for the La Pointe Band and other Indians who might settle with 
them. he maintained tribal relations with the Indians on the reservation and 
was recognized as a Chippewa Indian by other Indians); Petition of 
Carmen, 165 F .Supp. 942, 948 (N.D.Cal.1958) (finding no doubt that 
petitioner is an Indian subject to the Major Crimes Act as he is an Indian by 
blood and enrolled as a member of the Mono tribe), affd sub nom. Dickson 
v. Carmen. 270 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.1959); see also Halbert v. United States, 
283 U.S. 753, 762-63, 51 S.Ct. 615, 75 L.Ed. 1389 (1931) (noting the 
general rule that the right of individual Indians to share in tribal property 
depends on tribal membership); Vezina v. United States, 245 F. 411 (8th 
Cir.1917) (holding that person who was by blood of the Fond du Lac band 
of the Chippewas of Lake Superior who moved to the reservation, was 
recognized. enrolled, and secured allotments upon the reservation were 
members). 
5 As we observed in United States v. Jackson, 600 F_.2d 1283, 1285-86 (9th 
Ci;.1979): 
Section 1153 should be read in conjunction with § 1152, which 
extends "the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of 
offenses ... to the Indian country" with certain exceptions .... Thus, the 
general rule is that "except for the offenses enumerated in (section 
1153), all crimes committed by enrolled Indians against other Indians 
within Indian country are subject to the jurisdiction of tribal courts." 
United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641. 643 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 1395. 
1397, n. 2, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977). 
6 One circuit court (functioning as a trial court) found based on evidence of 
custom and prior enrollment that one-eighth blood was sufficient to be 
enrolled as a member of a particular tribe that the persons involved (who 
were of mixed Indian blood) had chosen to identify themselves with, and to 
be entitled to tribal benefits. Sully v. United States, 195 F. 113 
(C.C.D.S.D.1912). Whether or not one-eighth blood is sufficient in some 
cases, there is no evidence in this case that it would suffice for purposes of 
membership in, or identification with, any relevant tribe. 
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AT f' ,:x3 O'CLOCK----'=..M. 
JUN 2 2 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF IDAHO 
WILLIAM WOLFE, 
Petitioner/Defendant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent/Plaintiff. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO.CR 1982-18920 
ORDER DISMISSING MOTION 
Mr. Wolf filed a Motion for Correction of Sentence pursuant to ICR 35 on June 
171 2011. Mr. Wolf previously filed a similar motion under ICR 35 in this case. 
That motion was denied by the Honorable John Bradbury. 
The petitioner is only permitted to file one (1) motion under ICR 35. 
Therefore 1 the petitioner's second motion, filed June 17, 2011 is Dismissed. 
So Ordered this 22nd day of June, 2011. r; 
~C/~ 
' Mkhaett.Grffi n /v 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
William Wolfe, 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
State of Idaho 
Defendant( s). 
) 
) 
) Case No. CR 82-18290 
) CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
) 
) 
) 
. ) 
I, the undersigned, a Deputy Court Clerk of the above-entitled court, do 
hereby certify that a copy of the Order Dismissing Motion filed in this case on June 22, 
2011 was mailed or delivered by me on June 22, 2011 to: 
William Wolfe#18593 
I.S.C.I. 1 Unit 13C-68A 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Attorney General's Office 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
State Appellate Public Defender 
364 7 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703-6914 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Attn: Clerk 
PO Box 83720 
Boise1 ID 83720-0101 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Kathy M. Ackerman, Clerk 
/~rmv voe uty / . 
000366-
IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
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-~ 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY DOCKETED AUG 1 6 2011 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
SARA B. THOMAS 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 5867 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff~Respondent, 
V. 
WILLIAM WOLFE, 
Defendant-Appellant 
) 
~ ' 
) 
) 
) 
~ 
) 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CASE NO. CR 1982-18290 
S.C. DOCKET NO. 38896 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE 
PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR, 416 W. MAIN 
STREET, P.O. BOX 463, GRANGEVILLE, ID, 83530, AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1 . The above-named appellant appeals against the above-named 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Dismissing Motion 
entered in the above-entitled action on the 29th day of April, 2011, the Honorable 
Michael J. Griffin, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders 
under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 11 (c)(1-1 0). 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page O U U J ti 1 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then 
. intends to assert in the· appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall 
not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, are: 
(a) Did the district court err in determining that the interest in finality of 
judgment prevented the court from determining whether the court 
had subject matter jurisdiction in this case? 
(b) Did the district court err in finding that Mr. Wolfe's Rule 35 motion, 
in which he asserted that his sentence was illegal because the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case, had 
previously been ruled upon by the district court? 
(c) Did the district court err in finding that Mr. Wolfe could not file a 
second Rule 35 motion asserting that his sentence was illegal? 
4. No portions of the record have been sealed. 
5. Reporter's Transcript: The appellant does not request a transcript in this 
case. 
6. Clerk's Record. The appellant requests a limited clerk's record pursuant 
to I.AR. 28(b)(2). The appellant requests the following documents to be included 
in the clerk's record: 
(a) All documents filed in this case from December 2, 2004; to present, 
including but not limited to all motions, orders, memorandums, affidavits, and 
briefs; 
(b) The following documents contained in the district court record of 
Idaho County Case Number CV-2005-36455, which were specifically cited in the 
district court's order, which was then incorporated into the order on appeal in this 
case, consisting of: 
(i) Memorandum Decision And Order, tiled October 26, 2006; 
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(ii) Affidavit of Wayne McGregor in Support of Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, filed August 11, 2005; 
(iii) Memorandum and Order, filed May 9, 2005; 
(iv) Affidavit of Brit Groom, including exhibits A through M, filed 
January 12, 2006; 
(v) Petitioner's Exhibit C; 
(vi) Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed February 11, 2005; 
(vii) Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Emergency/ 
Expedited Proceedings, filed February 11, 2005; 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has not been served on the_ 
Court Reporter because a transcript has not been requested; 
(b) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho 
Code§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(e)); 
(c) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a 
criminal case (1.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 23(a)(8)); 
(d) That arrangements have been made with Idaho County who will be 
responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript, as the client is 
indigent, Idaho Code§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(e); 
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(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to I.AR 20. 
DATED this 16th day of August, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of August, 2011, caused a 
true and correct copy of the attached AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to be 
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
416 W MAIN STREET 
PO BOX463 
GRANGEVILLE ID 83530 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
SBT/ns 
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Jeff P. Payne 
Attorney at Law 
114 S. Idaho Avenue 
Grangeville, ID 83530 
Phone: (208) 983-0760 
!SB# 3966 
Attorney for: Respondent 
!DAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
; /, ,,,, FILED D, 
AT ~. CX C}, O'CLOCK , .M. 
AUG 1 i 2005 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
7 THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
8 WILLIAM WOLFE, ) 
) Case No. CV 05-36455 
9 Petitioner, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
10 vs. ) WAYNE C. MACGREGOR 
) 
11 ) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
12 ) 
Respondent. ) 
13 
14 STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
15 County of Idaho ) 
16 I, Wayne C. MacGregor, being first duly sworn depose and state that: 
17 1. I am over the age of eighteen years; 
18 2. I am a resident ofidaho County, State ofidaho; 
19 3. I am an attorney currently licensed by the Idaho State Bar to practice law in the State of 
20 Idaho, and have been since /1, 5""J_ 
21 4. Since my admission to the Idaho State Bar in · /,s;}_ , I have been actively involved in 
22 the practice of law; 
23 5. During my career as an attorney I have acquired experience in many areas of the law, 
24 including both criminal and civil law. During my career, I have been the Idaho County Prosecuting 
25 Attorney, the Idaho County Public Defender, and have maintained a private practice. 
26 6. In the 1980's I represented William Wolfe in a post-conviction relief proceeding following 
27 
28 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
WAYNE C. MACGREGOR 
OU03'72 
--
1 his 1982 conviction for First Degree Murder in Idaho County. 
2 7. During the course ofmy representation of Mr. Wolfe, I reviewed the proceedings that led 
3 to Mr. Wolfe's First Degree Murder conviction and presented what I believed to be Mr. Wolfe's most 
4 meritorious post-conviction reliefissues during myrepresentation of Mr. Wolfe in the post-conviction 
5 relief proceedings. 
6 8. Issues presented in Mr. Wolfe's post-conviction relief proceeding included allegations of 
7 ineffective assistance of trial counsel. I am not aware of any meritorious ineffective assistance of 
8 counsel claims that were not raised in the post-conviction proceeding. Further, it is my belief that the 
9 ineffective assistance of counsel claims that were raised were adequately presented during the post-
10 conviction proceeding. 
11 9. In addition to the issues raised in the post-conviction relief proceeding, I considered other 
12 potential issues that were not raised and presented. Such issues were not raised or presented because 
13 I believed they lacked evidentiary support and/or merit. 
14 10. One issue I specifically considered, but did not raise or present, was the issue of the Idaho 
15 County District Court lackingjurisdiction over the offense under the theory that the Federal Court had 
16 exclusive jurisdiction because the offense involved an Indian killed on an Indian reservation. I 
1 7 considered and investigated the issue, but was unable to locate any admissible evidence to support the 
18 allegation that the victim, Scott Gold was an Indian. I specifically recall that during my consideration 
19 and investigation of the issue I contacted the Nez Perce Tribe and was advised the Mr. Gold was not 
20 a Nez Perce Indian. I believe I also contacted other tribes in an effort to determine whether Mr. Gold 
21 was an Indian, however, given the passage of time, I cannot recall specifically what other tribes I may 
22 have contacted. 
23 11. The information contained herein is true and accurate to the best of my recollection and 
24 belief. 
~ 
25 DATED this_.}_ day of August, 2005. 
26 
27 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3rof day of August, 2005. 
(NOTA!Z~ S_E~) 
,,.... ~f'- ..... .A, - ........ -.. - ...,._ 1'l 
~~FF P. PAYNE 
N@fARY PUBLIC 
STAfe OF IDAHO 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS was 
11 mailed by me by regular first class mail deposited in the U. S. Post Office at Grangeville, Idaho, this 
-'-'-"---'--- day of August, 2005, to: 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Brit Groom 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 227 
Cottonwood, ID 83522 
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AT 3, 1 O'CLOCK /J .M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
WILLIA."1\1 WOLFE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 05-36455 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
I. FACTS 
On February 22, 1982, \Villiam Wolfe was charged with first degree murder in 
the district court in Idaho County for killing Scott Gold outside the Silver Dollar Bar in 
Stites. State v. Wolfe, No. 18290 (Idaho 2nd Dist. Ct. Feb. 22, 1982). Mr. Wolfe's 
defense was that because he was so intoxicated at the time of the shooting, he was unable 
to form the requite intent to commit first-degree murder. A jury found Mr. Wolfe guilty 
and District Judge George Reinhardt imposed a fixed life sentence of imprisonment. On 
direct appeal, Mr. Wolfe challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and 
of an intention to murder with malice aforethought. He also contended his sentence was 
excessive. The court affim1ed Mr. Wolfe's conviction and sentence on November 30, 
1984. State v. Wolfe, 107 Idaho 676 (Ct. App. 1984). 
On August 11th, 1983, while the appeal was still pending and pursuant to Idaho's 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,§§ 19-4901 to 19-4909, Mr. Wolfe file a prose 
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petition for post-conviction relief. In that petition Mr. Wolfe alleged 1) ineffective 
assistance of counsel, 2) that he was entitled to a mistrial when jury members heard 
testimony concerning the case outside the jury room, 3) that the court abused its 
discretion in refusing to sequester the jury in light of the extensive media coverage of the 
trial, 4) the state's use of perjured testimony, 5) the use of Jim Fletcher as an expert 
witness, and 6) the state's use of Jim Fletcher in rebuttal of the defense's expert witness. 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Case No. 18290. On Aug 18, 19 8 3 Judge Reinhardt 
appointed counsel to assist Mr. Wolfe with his petition. State v. Wolfe, 113 Idaho 337, 
338 (Ct. App. 1987). On November 15\ 1984, Mr. Wolfe was transported to the Idaho 
County Courthouse for a hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. Id. At the 
hearing Mr. Wolfe's counsel also moved for reduction of the sentence pursuant to Rule 
35 of the Idaho Criminal Rules. Id. At the hearing, Mr. Wolfe and counsel focused on a 
reduction of the sentence rather than on the allegations of his post-conviction relief 
petition. Id. 
On February 13, 1985, Judge Reinhardt held that the conviction of Mr. Wolfe for 
first degree murder did not violate federal or state constitutions. He also found that Mr. 
vVolfe received a fair trial and was afforded due process throughout all proceeding. He 
denied the post-conviction petition and the motion for reduction of sentence. 
Mr. Wolfe filed a second petition for post-conviction relief on July I, 1985. 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Case No. 18290B. That petition alleged 1) that Mr. 
Wolfe's counsel failed to investigate the previous prose petition therefore violating his 
rights to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 2) that failure to investigate, deprived him of his 
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right to liberty without due process oflaw, and 3) that on May 20, 1982Judge Reinhardt 
prejudiced the jury by making statements in the Lewiston Tribune before the jury started 
deliberating on the evidence presented at trial. Id. 
On March 3, 1986, Judge Reinhardt granted the state's motion to dismiss Mr. 
Wolfe's second post-conviction relief petition (Case No. 18290B). He found that Mr. 
Wolfe's petition had not made a factual showing that entitled him to relief. On March 10, 
1986, Mr. Wolfe filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Case No. 18290B) which 
Judge Reinhardt denied on April 17, 1986. Mr. Wolfe then appealed case no. 18290B. 
On September 9, 1987, the court of appeals decided Mr. Wolfe's Post-
Conviction Relief Petition's 18290 and 18290B. State v. Wolfe, 113 Idaho 337 (Ct. App. 
,• 
1987). The court concluded that Mr. Wolfe raised issues in his application that required 
an evidentiary hearing. Id at 341. It found that Mr. Wolfe's second application, together 
with its incorporation of the first application, raised genuine issues of fact concerning the 
use of allegedly perjured testimony from a witness and on allegations of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel through failure to call certain witnesses. Id. The case was 
therefore remanded for a hearing. Id. 
Judge Reinhardt appointed Wayne MacGregor to represent Mr. Wolfe on March 
1, 1988 and May 13, 1988 and then held hearings on the remand. Mr. MacGregor argued 
for a reduction in his sentence, alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, that the trial 
court abused its discretion in personally examining two witnesses and in denying his 
motion for summary disposition. In addition, Mr. MacGregor investigated the issue of 
the court's jurisdiction over Mr. Wolfe's offense under the theory that the federal court 
had exclusive jurisdiction because the offense involved an Indian killed on an Indian 
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Reservation. Affidavit of Wayne MacGregor in support of Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at 2 . Mr. MacGregor 
contacted the Nez Perce Tribe and was told that the victim was not a member of the 
Tribe. Mr. MacGregor contacted other tribes but was unable to procure any evidence of 
the victim's affiliation with another Indian tribe. Given that, he did not object to the 
court's jurisdiction. Id. 
On August 26, 1988 Judge Reinhardt denied the petition. He held that: 1) Mr. 
Wolfe's conviction and sentence were not in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States of the State ofldaho, 2) there was no evidence of material facts, not previously 
presented and heard, that required vacation of Mr. Wolfe's conviction and sentence, and 
3) trial counsel's representation of Mr. Wolfe was neither inadequate nor incompetent 
and Mr. Wolfe's right to counsel was not infringed. Mr. Wolfe filed a timely appeal. 
The court of appeals affirmed Judge Reinhardt's decision in March of 1990. Wolfe v. 
State, 117 Idaho 645, 649 (Ct. App. 1990). 
On March 19, 1999, Mr. Wolfe filed a prose Motion for Clarification of 
Sentence. On May 5, 1999, Judge Reinhardt denied Mr. Wolfe's Motion for Clarification 
finding that the sentence was not illegally imposed under Idaho Code§ 19-2513A. 
On Dec 2, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a prose Motion for Rule 35 Relief from an 
Illegal Sentence. In his motion, Mr. Wolfe requested that I take judicial notice that; 1) 
that the victim was an Indian and member of the Nez Perce Tribe, 2) that the crime 
alleged occurred in Stites, Idaho, within the boundaries of a known Indian reservation, 3) 
that the prosecution never obtained any consent to act on behalf of the Nez Perce Tribal 
authorities, 4) that the crime of murder for which Mr. Wolfe was convicted is exclusively 
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under law of the United States, 5) and that Mr. Wolfe's sentence is illegal. On December 
14, 2004, I summarily denied Mr. Wolfe's Motion for Relief pursuant to Criminal Rule 
35 without reaching the merits because it was untimely. On December 27, 2004, Mr. 
Wolfe filed a Motion to Reconsider for LR. C.P. 60 (b) Relief alleging that an illegal 
sentence can be corrected.at any time. 
On February 11, 2005, Mr. Wolfe filed his third petition for post-conviction relief. 
In that petition he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel alleging his lawyer's failure to 
inform him of the court's lack of jurisdiction in a case involving the alleged murder of an 
Indian on the Nez-Perce Indian Reservation. He alleged that the federal courts have 
exclusive federal jurisdiction over crimes committed against Indians on an Indian 
reservation by virtue of the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. He also filed a 
Notice of Error, Objection and Request for Relief giving notice that the crime Mr. Wolfe 
was convicted of fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court and objected 
that the complaint and information filed against him failed to indicate that this court had 
jurisdiction, and that he did not have access to Idaho courts or maps. He also filed a 
Motion for Expedited or Emergency Proceedings requesting counsel and alleging: I) 
unlawfulness of judgment and conviction, 2) denial of a speedy trial and, 3) prejudice 
created by pre-indictment incarceration. 
On May 9, 2005, I issued a Memorandum and Order addressing Mr. Wolfe's 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. I held that Mr. Wolfe's argument that the state did 
not have jurisdiction to convict him of murder had merit under the Indian Major Crimes 
Act. I requested both parties and the Nez Perce Tribe to submit briefs regarding the 
jurisdiction issue. The Tribe did not file a brief. On February 16, 2006 I issued an Order 
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to Produce Military Records, and on May 11, 2006 I issued an Order to Produce Medical 
Records held by the Nez Perce Tribal Medical Facilities, both relating to Scott Gold to 
determine ifhe was a member of an Indian tribe. The military records of Mr. Gold along 
with a letter from the Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Nation and revealed that he 
was of Native American descent and the Nez Perce Tribal medical records revealed that 
he was one-half Blackfoot Indian and therefore eligible to receive medical services from 
the Nez Perce Clinic. See Exhibits A through M to the Affidavit of Brit Groom; 
Petitioner's Exhibit C.. The parties' arguments are outlined below. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the untimeliness of a petition for post-conviction relief should be 
excused because the convicting court was without subject matter jurisdiction appears to 
be a matter of first impression in Idaho. Interests in the finality of a court's judgment 
must be weighed with the concept of fundamental fairness. 
An action for post-conviction relief is civil in nature and is governed by the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588,591 (Ct.App.1993); Pizzuto v. 
State, 127 Idaho 469,470 (1995). Such an action may be summarily dismissed either on 
the state's motion or upon the comi's own initiative if the applicant's evidence has raised 
no genuine issue of material fact, which, ifresolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle 
him to the requested relief. I.C. § 19-4906; Medrano v. State, 127 Idaho 639, 643 
(Ct.App.1995); Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,761 (Ct.App.1991). For purposes of 
considering a summary dismissal motion an applicant's uncontroverted factual allegations 
contained in an application for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavits are 
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deemed to be true. Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 904 (Ct.App.1995); Roman v. State, 
125 Idaho 644,647 (Ct.App.l994);Ramirezv. State, 113 Idaho 87, 88 (Ct.App.1987). 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel an applicant must show 
that the lawyer's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. Berg 
v. State, 131 Idaho 517,520 (1998); Hassettv. State, 127 Idaho 313,316 (Ct.App.1995); 
Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct.App.1990). Deficient performance is established if 
the applicant shows that the representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Berg, 131 Idaho at 520; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988); 
Russell, 118 Idaho at 67. To establish prejudice the applicant must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the lawyer's deficient performance, the outcome of the criminal 
case would have been different. Berg, 131 Idaho at 520; Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761; 
Russell, 118 Idaho at 67. 
III. CONTENTIONS 
1. Mr. Wolfe contends: 
A. The victim, Scott Gold, was Native American and that the alleged 
crime of murder occurred on the Nez Perce Indian Reservation and 
that the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to try him for 
murder. He asserts that the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
1153, grants the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over his 
offense. 
B. The untimeliness of his petition should be excused because; 1) he was 
held out ofldaho State without access to any maps of the Nez Perce 
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Indian Reservation and, 2) a strict application of the time bar would 
work an injustice on the fundamental concept of justice. 
C. Because his counsel at the post-conviction hearing failed to object to 
the court's lack of jurisdiction, Mr. Wolfe did not have effective 
assistance of counsel. 
D. This court should consider his petition under Idaho's Habeas Corpus 
Statute as well as the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. 
2. The State ofldaho argues for summary dismissal of Mr. Wolfe's post-
conviction relief petition on the grounds that: 
A. Mr. Wolfe's petition for post-conviction relief was not timely filed. 
B. Mr. Wolfe's petition is barred as a successive petition for post-
conviction relief. 
C. Mr. Wolfe's allegations in support of his petition for post-conviction 
relief are bare and conclusory and do not raise a genuine issue of 
material fact. Specifically, that Mr. Wolfe has only submitted evidence 
that the victim in this case is an enrolled member the Blackfoot Tribe 
but fails to support the allegations that the crime occurred on the Nez 
Perce Reservation. 
D. Mr. Wolfe's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are bare 
and conclusory and do not raise issues of material fact. Specifically, 
that counsel for Mr. Wolfe considered raising an objection to 
jurisdiction but after investigation determined that the issues lack 
evidentiary support and merit. 
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E. This court does not have jurisdiction to consider Mr. Wolfe's request 
for habeas corpus relief. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
l. Claim of Jurisdictional Error 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA), I.C. § 19-4901 et seq., 
provides a mechanism for considering a variety of claims that could not be raised in trial 
or on direct appeal. The Act is available "to cure fundamental errors occurring at the trial 
which affect either the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the judgment." Maxfield 
v. State, 108 Idaho 493,499 (Ct.App.1985), (quoting Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469, 474-
75 (1971)). Mr. Wolfe alleges that a state court does not have jurisdiction to convict or 
sentence him and I.C. § 19-4901 is the proper avenue to claim a jurisdictional error. 
2. Timeliness of Mr. Wolfe's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
a. Constitutionality of a One Year Limit 
Under the UPCPA, LC. § 19-4902, an application for post-conviction relief"may 
be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from 
the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an 
appeal, whichever is later." In Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390 (1996), the court held 
that the imposition of a one-year limit on a defendant's right to file an application for 
post-conviction relief did not violate the defendant's right to due process oflaw. 1 This 
holding was later followed in Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530 (Ct. App. 1997). In that 
case Mr. Martinez argued that the one-year limitation period provided by LC. § 19-4902 
unconstitutionally infringed on his right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
1 A 1993 amendment shortened the time period from five years to one year. 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 
265 § 1, at 898. 
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States Constitution and Aliicle I,§ 13, of the Idaho Constitution. Id at 131. In 
dismissing Mr. Martinez's claim, the court opined that "the one-year limitation period 
provides prisoners a reasonable amount of time within which to file their applications for 
post-conviction relief." Id at 132. Indeed, the court in Hanks v. State, 121 Idaho 153, 
154 (Ct. App. 1992), concluded that "a reading of this statute [I.C. § 19-4902] clearly 
reveals the legislature's intent to make the time period for bringing an application for 
post-conviction relief limited by the time period in which the applicant could have 
perfected a direct appeal." 
b. Fundamental Justice 
Mr. Wolfe argues that "a strict application of [the] time bar would result in 
manifest injustice and is inconsistent with the concept of fundamental justice." Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief at 4. Mr. Wolfe cites Lafon v. State, 119 Idaho 387 (Ct. App. 
1991) and Olds v. State, 122 Idaho 976 (Ct. App. 1992) to support that proposition. 
In Lafon, the petitioner pled guilty to a charge of first degree murder and was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term oflife in prison. 119 Idaho at 388. On November .16, 
1987, nine years later, LaFon filed a prose application for post-conviction relief, asking 
that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. One ofLaFon's allegations was that 
his guilty plea was not knowingly entered because the sentence imposed upon him by the 
district court was altered by the Commission for Pardons and Parole (Commission). Id. 
The Commission, as a result of policy changes, decided in 1986 that Lafon was not 
eligible for parole; LaFon was not aware of the detrimental effect the changed policy 
would have on his parole eligibility until the 1986 decision. Id. 
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The court of appeals acknowledged the district court's finding that "a strict 
application of the five-year limitation would have the effect of depriving LaFon of his 
claim under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act before the claim actually arose; 
and that such a result would be "manifestly unjust" and "inconsistent with the concept of 
fundamental justice." Id at 390 n.5. The state did not challenge the district court's 
application of a discovery exception to this category which effectively allowed LaFon to 
file a petition for post-conviction relief well past the time allowed by statute. 2 In fact, the 
state in that case agreed that the discovery exception was applied properly. Id. 
The Lafon case differs significantly from the case at hand. Mr. Lafon's claim for 
post-conviction relief was only ripe once the Commission had made its ruling on Mr. 
Lafon's eligibility for parole. Mr. Lafon could not have known that the Commission was 
going to modify its parole eligibility requirements until it did so in 1986. The 
disadvantage arose only after the Commission acted. Due to these circumstances the 
state and district court agreed to allow Mr. Lafon, to submit a statutorily untimely petition 
for post-conviction relief. 
In Mr. Wolfe's case, the issue of jurisdiction has been ripe for challenge this 
case's inception. There have been no allegations that a change of policy or rules is the 
root cause of Mr. Wolfe's untimely petition. Lafon is inapposite. 
Mr. Wolfe also cites Olds, 122 Idaho 976, for the proposition that a challenge to 
unlawful commitment can be brought any time. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at 4. 
The court in that case affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Mr. Olds' post-
conviction petition. Id at 316. The court held that the appropriate method for a challenge 
to Mr. Olds' unlawful commitment or confinement was a writ of habeas corpus which 
2 The discovery exception doctrine will be further addressed below. 
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may be brought at any time and is exempt from the time constraints which post-
conviction petitions are subject. Id at 315. The Olds case is also inapposite. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to a motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. 
The current petition for post-conviction relief was filed on February 11, 2005, over 
twenty years after the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for post-
conviction relief. The failure to file a timely petition is a basis for its dismissal. 
Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189 (2001). Absent some evidence that the ~tatute of 
limitations was tolled, the current petition for post-conviction relief is untimely. 
3. Equitable Tolling 
a. Access to Idaho Legal Materials 
Equitable tolling of the statute oflimitations for filing a post-conviction relief 
petition is recognized in two situations. One is where a petitioner was incarcerated in an 
out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction without legal representation or access to 
Idaho legal materials. See Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530,536 (Ct.App.1997) rev. 
denied (October 6, 1997), (where an inmate is denied access to Idaho courts, the 
limitation period for filing a UPCP A may be tolled until inmate gains ability to access the 
court). 
In Martinez the petitioner seeking post-conviction relief submitted evidence 
indicating that after his conviction he was housed in a California penal institution without 
access to Idaho legal materials and without appointed counsel. Id at 133. The court held 
that Martinez had made a "prima facie showing that he was deprived of meaningful 
access to Idaho courts, to which he was entitled under Art. I,§ 18 of the Idaho 
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Constitution, during his incarceration in California." Id. The court further reasoned that 
in order to "prevent prejudice to Martinez from this abridgement of his access to Idaho 
courts, we are constrained to hold that, if Martinez were to sustain his burden of proving 
such abridgement at an evidentiary hearing, the limitation period for his post-conviction 
action would be deemed tolled until Martinez was afforded access to Idaho courts 
through his retained counsel." Id. 
Mr. Wolfe claims that he has not been allowed access to maps while incarcerated 
by the Idaho Department of Corrections (I.D.O.C.). He has failed to submit any evidence 
of how an I.D.O.C. rule prohibiting inmates from access to maps has in any way hindered 
his ability to investigate claims that this court may have been without jurisdiction to try 
and convict him. Mr. Wolfe has had over twenty years, with the benefit of appointed 
counsel, to raise a claim regarding the jurisdiction of this court. In fact, Mr. Wolfe was 
approached by a paralegal friend "on or about the end of2004" who raised the issue of 
exclusive federal jurisdiction on Indian reservations. Petitioner's Memorandum in 
Support of Emergency/Expedited Proceedings at 2. It was only after this conversation 
that the I.D.O.C. policy regarding maps became an issue. Therefore, the theory of 
equitable tolling due to a denial of access to the Idaho courts does not apply here. 
Mr. Wolfe also contends that a discovery exception to the time limits for filing an 
application for post-conviction relief should apply. The discovery exception doctrine in 
the post-conviction context allows an applicant additional time in which to file a petition 
for relief after discovery of new evidence. He argues that he was denied access to maps 
while detained and therefore, was unable to determine if the Silver Dollar Bar at Stites 
was within the Nez Perce Indian Reservation. 
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The Idaho appellate courts have never squarely decided whether a discovery 
exception may be engrafted onto the limitation period of I.C. § 19-4901. See Martinez, 
130 Idaho at 537; Chapman v. State, 128 Idaho 733, 735 (Ct. App. 1996). In Housley v. 
State, 119 Idaho 885, 888 (Ct.App.1991), the court argued that a discovery exception to 
I.C. § 19-4902 "may have merit in some cases." However, the court did not address the 
merits of Mr. Housley's argument because the record disallowed the applicant's 
allegation of late discovery of the facts upon which he based his claim for relief Id. 
Assuming a discovery exception is available in Idaho, it does not help Mr. Wolfe. 
The boundaries of the Nez Perce Indian Reservation were established by the treaty of 
1855 and have been a matter of public record ever since. The allegation that he just 
recently discovered that Stites was within the Reservation and that the court's jurisdiction 
was an is~ue is disingenuous. The issue of whether Mr. Gold was a Native American was 
investigated by Wayne MacGregor in the 1980's. Inquires to the Nez Perce Tribe and 
other tribes disclosed no useful information. The explicit purpose of that inquiry was that 
if Mr. Gold were Native American, the court's jurisdiction could be questioned. The 
predicate necessary for such an inquiry is that the offense occurred within the boundaries 
of the Reservation. This issue of jurisdiction preemption was discussed and not pursued3 
because there was no evidence that Mr. Gold was Native American. Accordingly, the 
alleged fact of the offense occurring on the Reservation is not newly discovered and the 
discovery exception does not apply. 
b. Mentallncompetency 
The second situation that warrants tolling of the one year limit is when mental 
disease and/or psychotropic medication render a petitioner incompetent and prevent him 
3 Mr. MacGregor's failure to object to this court's jurisdiction is further addressed below. 
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from pursuing a timely challenge to his conviction. See Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 
385 (Ct.App.1996). The Abbott court said: 
Abbott's assertion that mental disease or psychotropic medication rendered him 
incompetent and prevented him from earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction 
are sufficient to raise factual issues and intertwining legal issues as to whether he 
was prevented from timely filing his action by mental incapacity or medication, 
whether strict application of the one-year statute oflimitation would deprive 
Abbott of any meaningful opportunity to present his claims for post-conviction 
relief, and whether the statute of limitation should be deemed tolled in such 
circumstance to avoid violation of constitutional due process guarantees. 
See also Isaak v. State, 132 Idaho 369, 370 n. 1 (Ct.App.1999). 
Mr. Wolfe has never alleged he suffered from any mental disease or that 
psychotropic medication rendered him incompetent and therefore prevented him from 
earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction. 
c. · "Extraordinary Circumstances" 
In 2005 the court, in Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho 579 (Ct. App. 2005), 
recognized that "[o]ther courts have adopted ap_ "extraordinary circumstances" or "rare 
and exceptional circumstances" standard for determining when the statute of limitation 
for a post-conviction or habeas corpus action is equitably tolled." Id., quoting Laws v. 
Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Where a habeas petitioner's mental 
incompetence in fact caused him to fail to meet the ... filing deadline, his delay was 
caused by an 'extraordinary circumstance beyond [his] control,' and the deadline should 
be equitably tolled."); Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3rd Cir. 2001) (remanding for 
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evidentiary hearing to determine whether habeas petitioner's mental health problems 
constituted extraordinary circumstances, such as uncontrollable circumstances which 
prevent a petitioner from timely filing, and excusable neglect is insufficient); Smith v. 
McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2nd Cir. 2000) (in order for equitable tolling to apply, habeas 
petitioner must show that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his 
petition on time, and that he acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he 
seeks to toll). 
The Ninth Circuit has also applied the doctrine of equitable tolling to post-
conviction petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 
F.3d 796, 798 (9 th Circuit 2003), the court tolled the one year statute of limitation for 
filing a habeas petition due to the "extraordinary circumstance" of egregious misconduct 
on the part of the petitioner's counsel. In Spitsyn, a state prisoner's mother hired a lawyer 
almost a full year before his habeas filing deadline. After months of inactivity, Spitsyn 
and his mother wrote to the lawyer, but received no response. As the filing deadline 
approached, Spitsyn and his mother contacted the state bar association seeking assistance. 
Spitsyn also sent his lawyer another letter asking for his file. The lawyer did not respond 
to any of these letters before the filing deadline passed. Finally, after the deadline, the 
lawyer sent a letter "expressing regret for not following through with the case and 
returning the Spitsyns' payment." Months later, the lawyer returned Spitsyn's file. 
Spitsyn then filed a pro se habeas petition, which the district court dismissed as untimely. 
On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that "the misconduct of Spitsyn' s lawyer 
was sufficiently egregious to justify equitable tolling of the one-year limitation period ... " 
Id at 801. The court has also decided that a one year statute of limitation for filing for 
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post-conviction relief may be equitably tolled if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a 
prisoners control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Brambles v. Duncan, 330 
F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003), amended in other respects by 342 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
In Bryant v. St.ate of Idaho, 79 Fed. Appx. 257, 258 (9th Cir. 2003), the petitioner 
claimed that his "prison transfers, the inadequacy of the prison libraries, his counsel's late 
notification of the finality of appeal, and his counsel's failure to inform him of the 
AE.D.P.A. [The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996] limitation" 
constituted extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. The court of appeals 
held that, while it has recognized prison transfers and inadequate prison libraries as 
grounds for granting equitable tolling, the inquiry is "highly fact dependant." Id. citing 
Lott v. Mueller 304 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 
1146 (9th Cir.2000) ( en bane)). The petitioner in the Bryant case failed to allege specific 
facts proving that the transfers or the insufficient library holdings affected his ability to 
file on time. Id. Similarly, the court found that Mr. Bryant's two other claims alleging 
misconduct on the part of his counsel were negligent, not rising to the level of 
"egregious", and therefore did not constitute extraordinary circumstances. Id at 258-259; 
see also Ford v. Hubbard, 330 F.3d 1086, 1106 (9th Cir.2002); Frye v. Hickman, 273 
F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.2001); cf. Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 796. 
Wolfe has not submitted evidence demonstrating that any "extraordinary 
circumstance" prevented him from filing a petition on time or that he acted with 
reasonable diligence throughout the period he was seeking to toll. Wayne MacGregor, 
Mr. Wolfe's counsel for the first and second post-conviction petitions, avers that he 
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considered but rejected making an objection to this court's lack of jurisdiction. Affidavit 
of Wayne MacGregor at 2. While Mr. Wolfe's present counsel has found evidence that 
Mr. Gold was Native American, it was an arduous and expensive undertaking. That fact 
does not detract from Mr. MacGregor's work. The standard is not what is possible. It is 
what is reasonable. Berg, 131 Idaho at 520. I find.and conclude that Mr. MacGregor's 
inquiry and advice regarding jurisdiction was reasonable. 
4. The Court's Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The evidence now available persuades me that there is a genuine issue of whether 
the court had had jurisdiction because there is credible admissible evidence that Mr. Gold 
was in fact a Native American. It is important to note, however, that that evidence 
merely puts the issue in play. There are other issues that would have to be resolved 
before a conclusion about jurisdiction could be drawn. See, e.g., South Dakota v. 
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 410-11 (1994); 
Solem v. Barlett, 465 U.S. 463,466 (1984); Seymore v. Superintendent of Wash. State 
Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351,354 (1962); United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127, 1129-30 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
That squarely presents the difficult issue of whether or not jurisdiction can be 
raised at any time regardless of statutory or equitable constraints. That issue puts in stark 
relief the tension between two fundamental but competing legal precepts: the court's 
power to act and the need for finality of judgments. That gives rise to a paradox. 
Judgments by a court without jurisdiction are void. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare v. 
Housel, 140 Idaho 96 (2004); State v. Battens, 137 Idaho 730, (Ct. App. 2002). Finality 
assumes the existence of a judgment. 
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The applicable statutes come down on the side of finality. The UPCP A permits a 
person who has been convicted or sentenced for a crime to have judicial review of a 
claim that "the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence" or that there were 
"material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the sentence 
in the interest of justice." I.C. § 19-4901(2) & (4). The Act grants the applicant the right 
to petition for review "within one (1) year :from the expiration of the time for appeal or 
:from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of an appeal or :from the 
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." LC. § 19-4902 
(a). The Act unambiguously contemplates that the absence of jurisdiction can occur and 
that if it is not raised within the prescribed time limits a remedy is not available. 
Criminal Rule 12(b)(2) imposes comparable constraints. It provides that 
objections or defenses to the complaint, indictment, or information can be raise1 only 
"during the pendency of the proceedings." The offense occurred in 1982. The trial was 
held in 1982. The third and final appeal was decided in 1990. No matter how 
"proceedings" is defined, they are long over. 
There is a dearth of authority on this issue. The U.S. District Court in North 
Carolina held that the interests in finality trump jurisdiction. Jones v. State of South 
Carolina, 2005 WL 2837537, slip op at 2 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2005). While it is logically 
difficult to give finality to a judgment that may be void, the equities of this case argue 
that applying that precedent to Mr. Wolfe is fair. 
None of the three appeals found the fairness of the trial wanting. There has been 
no evidence presented that Mr. Wolfe did not murder Mr. Gold. Twenty-four years have 
elapsed since the offense was committed. Sixteen years have elapsed since the last 
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appeal was decided. The evidence is overwhelming that he was effectively represented 
during that entire process. There is nothing fundamentally unfair about applying the 
UPCPA as it is written because Mr. Wolfe received the process he was due. 
5. Habeas Petition 
In addition to the request for relief under the UPCP A, Mr. Wolfe requests that the 
court "consider the whole of this petition as done via Idaho's Habeas Corpus Statute§ 
19-4201 et seq." (See Petition for Post-Conviction Relief). However, under I.C. § 19-
4202, original jurisdiction for habeas petitions resides in the supreme court and the 
district court of the county in which the person is detained. Mr. Wolfe is currently 
detained in Ada County. Therefore, the Idaho County district court does not have 
jurisdiction to consider Mr. Wolfe's petition for habeas corpus relief. 
Having had the benefit of extensive briefing and upon further reflection, I 
conclude my Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 9, 2005, in this case was 
improvident and should be vacated. 
V.ORDER 
1. The Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 9, 2005 is VACATED 
2. This court ADVISES all parties to this action of its intention to dismiss the Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief. As required by Idaho Code § l 9-4906(b) you are notified that 
you have 20 days in which to respond to the PROPOSED DISMISSAL. 
.:,....:,.:;.,..- ./ 
It is so ordered this ..::.:l(rJ day of October, 2006. 
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Y J ohri"'H. Bradbury t/ 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
WILLIAM WOLFE, ) CASE NO. CV-05-36455 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF BRIT GROOM 
vs. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
COMES NOW t BRIT GROOM, being duly sworn on oath, and deposes 
and says: 
1) That my name is Brit Groom; 
2) That I represent the above-named Plaintiff; 
3) That a Motion For Extension Of Time To File Responsive Pleadings is 
filed herewith; 
4) That the opposing party in this matter is not prejudice by this Motion 
because the Plaintiff remains in custody of the Idaho Department of Corrections 
AFFIDAV17' OF BRIT GROOM 1 0. 00 ,, '. JSt 
during the pendency of these actions; 
5) That a Responsive Pleading was due on December 16, 2005, pursuant to 
the Court's earlier Order; 
6) However, due to a clerical error, I had the due date listed as January 16, 
2006; 
7) That I have contacted the Idaho State Tax Commission to request tax 
records for Scott Gold. The Commission is in the process of determining how I 
may access Mr. Gold's tax records (Subpoena, Court Order, etc.); 
8) That I have written a second letter to the Marine Corps National 
Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri, requesting record information 
on Scott Gold. A true and correct copy is attached hereto as "Exhibit A". A 
true and correct copy of my initial letter is attached hereto as "Exhibit B" for the 
Court's reference; 
9) A recent telephone conversation with Personnel at the Records Center in 
St. Louis indicated an estimated 30-45 days of additional time necess.ary to 
process my request. 
'71'r -- ' 
DATED this /;), day of January, 2006.\~---
~~ 
Plaintiff's Attorney 
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SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me on this /J~ay of January, 2006. 
ERIN BLINN 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
(SEAL) 
fJMv~ 
Notary Public in and for Idaho 
Residing at: Grct.11£:fWtlle.-. 
My Commission expires: m/ct/;K)tl 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~ay of January, 2006, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the individual listed below by hand-
delivering the same to the attorney's court box at the Idaho County Courthouse in 
Grangeville, Idaho. 
Mr. Jeff Payne 
Attorney 
Idaho County Courthouse 
Grangeville, Idaho 83530 
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Brit Grdfun 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
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504 King St., Suite 1 
POBox.227 
Cottonwood, Idaho 83522 
January 2, 2006 
£)(fltf3!T ~A 
BRIT D. GROOM 
LAWYER 
Director, National Personnel Records Center 
Military Personnel Records Branch 
9700 Page Ave. 
St. Louis, Missouri 63132-5295 
RE: Scott Gold, NPRC Registration No. N5026945 
Dear Sfr or Madam: 
I am writing to inquire about your response to~:) . er~·,: @:~~~ber 1, 2005. ~~----. 
Enclosed, you will find that letter, and I would apprecfuie·'y ~'.telllonse {q my requests in this 
matter as soon as possible. Please call me if you have any questions or cbhcems. Thank you. 
BG;eb 
Enclosure 
?fl-l?-Ot.?.-7?.?.Q Tt>.l. 
Sincerely yours, 
Brit Groom 
:Email: groomlawJ@yahoo.com 208-962-7128 Fax. 
504 King St., Suite 1 
POBox227 
Cottonwood, Idaho 83522 
December 1, 2005 
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BRIT D. GROOM 
LAWYER 
Director, National Personnel Records Center 
Military Personnel Records Branch 
9700 Page Ave. 
St. Louis, Missouri 63132~5295 
Re: Scott Gold, NPRC Registration No. N5026945 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
My name is Brit Groom, and I am the attorney appointed to represent Mr. William 
Wolfe. A copy of my appointment is enclosed. /;::,',. . 
On August 5, 1982, Mr. Wolfe was sentenced for the ~rcte@"w®\~d. A 
copy of Mr. Gold's obituary is enclosed. \~ ~1/ fF: ii 
Recent developments indicate that Mr. Gold was a Native American. Iftbii is correct, 
then Mr. Wolfe was wrongfully convicted, as the l.ocal Idaho State Court had no jurisdiction 
over the case. 
Previously, I had conracted Ms. Teresa D. Ross at Headquarters Marine Corp. She 
told me that I need ro contact your office and request a copy of Mr. Gold's official military 
personnel file (OMPF). I am doing so at this time. 
The attachments hereto should be sufficient to show "proof of death" of Mr. Gold. If 
they are not, please let me know. 
Thank you in advance for you assistance in this matter. 
BG:eb 
En.closures 
208-962-7229 Tel. 
Sincerely yours, 
~-,:;:, /~----~--~-,--. L~~</7· 
Brit/, Groom · ./4' 
/,,.-
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